

**From Lasswell to Snowden:
Do All Democracies End Up as Garrison States?
Methodological Notes**

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Abstract

We hypothesize that since World War II, democracies exhibit long-term trends toward larger and more active national security apparatuses. A necessary condition for this to occur is growing consensus among legislative elites regarding national security issues. We report on an ongoing research project designed to assess the hypothesis by looking at consensus, focusing on methodological issues involved in studying legislative debates to determine agreement in reasoning about national security. Particular attention is paid to the logic of and procedures for coding speeches as arguments; there is also a preliminary discussion about criteria for categorizing arguments as similar or different.

In the nearly three years since Edward Snowden's revelations about the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), it has become clear in one country after another that such surveillance is carried out by each country's own agencies, that the surveillance has been going on for some time, and that it is on a wider scale than had previously been suspected. In spite of this realization, the majority reaction among political elites has been that although some correctives may be needed, the world is simply too dangerous to forgo these tools. Thus, two years after Snowden thrust the NSA into the news, a mild reform of the agency—which nonetheless continued, directly or indirectly, its data collection programs—passed the Congress overwhelmingly and was signed immediately into law.¹ In France, a bill expanding surveillance powers was approved a good 4 months before the attacks in Paris; after the attacks, a state of emergency, which involved further expansion of surveillance powers, was declared, then extended. Similar legislation has either already been enacted or is in the process of being approved by the parliaments of other countries, with even the Swiss doing the same.² In sum, while Snowden's documents may well have sparked a focus on

¹ The reaction by the former head of the NSA to the congressional vote was “If somebody would come up to me and say ‘Look, Hayden, here’s the thing: This Snowden thing is going to be a nightmare for you guys for about two years. And when we get all done with it, what you’re going to be required to do is that little 215 program about American telephony metadata — and by the way, you can still have access to it, but you got to go to the court and get access to it from the companies, rather than keep it to yourself’ — I go: ‘And this is it after two years? Cool!’”

² For example, the UK parliament expanded surveillance in 2014 (<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/14/uk-emergency-surveillance-law-blow-privacy>) and was described as “likely to be satisfied” if future legislation were to embody the recommendations of a new watchdog report: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/11/uk-intelligence-agencies-should-keep-mass-surveillance-powers-report-gchq>. In fact, a bill now wending its way through Parliament has been revised to give the police even greater powers: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/01/snoopers-charter-to-extend-police-access-to-phone-and-internet-data>. In France, both houses of parliament passed versions of a new law expanding surveillance: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/france-passes-new-surveillance-law-in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-attack> and <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2015/0609/France-moves-closer-to-adopting-expansive-surveillance-law>; the bill was then approved two months later by the Constitutional Council: <http://www.theverge.com/2015/7/24/9030851/france-surveillance-law-charlie-hebdo-constitutional-court>. The state of emergency extended further the state's powers to search computer data: <https://www.justsecurity.org/27812/emergency-powers-accumulate/>, powers which were maintained in the extension. In Switzerland, a bill expanding surveillance was

surveillance, they have not led to significant restrictions on the agencies engaging in those activities more broadly but have instead provoked explicit approval of them by national legislatures.

Moreover, in spite of the numerous controversies raised about the NSA's activities in other countries, cooperation between the agency and its foreign counterparts has ended up being either resumed or strengthened. That cooperation was extensive, covering some 38 states with whom the NSA had ongoing relationships. Although comparable data for the present day are of course unavailable, country-specific news stories suggest that the political fracas did not seriously interrupt either bilateral or multilateral forms of signals intelligence cooperation.³ Of course, this persistence of cooperation in the face of condemnation—to be specific, the apparent surprise at the extent of surveillance, the carefully worded condemnations, the eventual return to the status quo ante, and the legislative thumbs-up to even more extensive and intrusive actions—extends well beyond surveillance to myriad forms of security-related activities. Take for example the issue of drone strikes by the U.S. against targets in Pakistan and Yemen. These strikes, which became far more frequent under the Obama Administration than its predecessor, have been widely condemned, so much so that two years ago, only France and the UK stood with the U.S. on the issue, while Germany, the host to an airbase from which almost every strike is coordinated, said it was unaware that the base was being used for that purpose. But Germany did nothing to end the strikes, with a high-ranking prosecutor concluding that they were not in fact illegal; and another U.S. ally, Italy, in

approved by the lower house of parliament in the spring (http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/37d03a12-cc8f-11e4-ab43-77e6948b78b0/Loi_sur_le_Renseignement_la_gauche_ne_parvient_pas_%C3%A0_la_corriger) and, with language somewhat more favorable still to the intelligence services, by the upper house: <http://www.tdg.ch/suisse/autorite-independante-doit-surveiller-services-secrets/story/12889918>; the bill was passed in September 2015, though a referendum will take place before it goes into effect: http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/privacy-and-surveillance_new-intelligence-law-likely-to-face-referendum/41675844. In Germany, notwithstanding politicians' condemnation of data retention laws, a bill permitting law enforcement agencies to access metadata for phone calls and internet connections was passed in October 2015: <https://lawfareblog.com/german-bundestag-passes-new-data-retention-law>. Even in Japan, a country neither involved militarily in the Middle East nor seen as having a potentially suspect domestic minority, legislation was passed reinforcing surveillance regulations: <https://giswatch.org/en/country-report/communications-surveillance/japan>.

³ A good summary of the situation as of 2013 is a March 2015 roundup piece by a surveillance blog: <http://electrospace.blogspot.ch/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html>; examples of continuing or renewed signals intelligence cooperation include Germany: <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-restarts-joint-intelligence-surveillance-with-us/a-18968519>; the UK: <https://www.justsecurity.org/29203/british-searches-america-tremendous-opportunity/>; France: <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/630024/us-france-to-strengthen-intelligence-sharing>; and, in spite of its own NSA spying scandal (<http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/nsa-spying-on-japan-the-fallout/>), Japan: <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/12/national/japan-u-s-enhance-maritime-surveillance-space/#.Vtr2fpMrKys>.

spite of concern over the death of one of its own nationals in a strike, refused to condemn the operation. Some months later, Italy ended up agreeing to the use of its own territory for drone strikes in Libya.⁴

The short-lived controversies over surveillance and drone strikes suggest two things: that security-related activities of this sort are becoming increasingly ubiquitous by states acting both unilaterally and multilaterally; and that those activities are strongly backed by the majority of legislative elites in the countries carrying them out. Indeed, there is a close tie between these two points since it is the support of those elites which makes it possible for legislation to be passed, budgets to grow, and controversies to be avoided or short-circuited. Thus, counterterrorism budgets in Western countries have increased massively over the past 15 years (EPRS 2015) with very little political opposition, and even earlier domestic security agency scandals such as the discovery of COINTELPRO (the FBI), the Finucane affair (MI5), and the *Canard Enchaîné* bugging (DST) have failed to stop the upward trajectory in funding and activity. Arguably, there is a long-term trend toward larger and more active national security apparatuses in a number of democratic countries, with this trend being enabled and strengthened by a growing consensus among legislative elites. This claim is the starting point for this paper and the research project on which it serves as a progress report.

The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin with a discussion of the central claim, situating the part of that claim about a long-term trend within the scholarly literature, articulating mechanisms which conduce to the trend, and elaborating its theoretical and substantive significance. We then turn to the second half of the claim (about growing legislative elite consensus in democratic countries), discussing not only its theoretical import but the way in which it points to a concrete research design through which the trend part of the claim can be assessed. The remaining

⁴ See: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/only-us-uk-and-france-vote-against-the-unhcr-resolution-to-probe-legality-of-drone-strikes/5377753>; <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ramstein-base-in-germany-a-key-center-in-us-drone-war-a-1029279.html>; <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-us-drones-idUSBRE94U0WV20130531>; <https://www.justsecurity.org/24440/germans-highest-ranking-prosecutor-legality-drone-strikes/>; <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/24/italians-grieve-over-hostage-killed-in-drone-strike.html>; <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/22/italy-us-military-drones-isis-libya-sicily-base>.

sections of the paper concern a specific methodological issue: how to use speeches in parliamentary debates as indicators of elite consensus. Speeches are arguments of various sorts, and so we address in detail how speeches can be coded in order to abduce those arguments. We then briefly discuss the issue of analyzing arguments in order to determine consensus.

Note that the principal focus of this paper is methodological: how to study legislative elite consensus. Of course, that methodological focus is in support of a much broader research project about whether there is a long-term trend whereby democracies transform into what Lasswell called “garrison states” (see below). This trend, precisely because of its theoretical and above all substantive significance, requires assessment in a careful and systematic fashion rather than relying on isolated episodes or data from all-purpose compendia. Most of the methodological issues we discuss in this paper require no technical expertise or formal skills and, by making explicit our data construction techniques, our hope is to contribute to a clearer understanding, as well as a more grounded critique, of the project findings we expect to be reporting starting a half-year or so from now.⁵

1. The garrison state

There are several scholarly literatures arguing that there is likely to be a trend toward significant expansion of state capabilities connected with national security.⁶ The oldest of these literatures—although there has been a revival of work in just the last few years (e.g., Engel 2011; Morgan 2004; Friedberg 2000)—stems from the evocative argument by the political scientist Harold Lasswell about the “garrison state” (Lasswell 1937, 1941, 1950, 1962; earlier revivals are, e.g., Aron 1979; Fitch 1985). Lasswell’s original focus, and that of most scholars who have used his

⁵ The project calls for coding three parliamentary debates per time period, for three time periods, for eight countries. As there are roughly 30 speeches per debate, there are over 1800 speeches that have to be coded by hand (see below for a brief discussion as to why machine coding is, for current technology, not feasible). Coding began in October 2015 and we have now done approximately 75% of the coding of one debate for each of three countries.

⁶ See below for a discussion about the distinction between debates over “national security” issues and over other issue domains. There is not a hard and fast dividing line, which is why we refer to “state capabilities connected with national security”; we have in mind at least the military; intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, including covert operations capabilities; and bureaucracies charged with preventing or defending against terrorism.

ideas, was on a structural tendency in democratic countries for “specialists on violence” to play an ever greater political role. That “developmental construct,” as Lasswell termed the tendency, goes along with a second strand of literature, this on institutional political development (Katznelson and Shefter 2002: pt. 4; Sparrow 2011; Thorpe 2014). The argument here is that, at least for the USA, state building dynamics in the mid-20th century were particularly concentrated in agencies having to do with issues of national security. These political science arguments are buttressed by additional work by legal scholars and diplomatic historians (Hogan 1998; Stuart 2008; Ackerman 2010) on the emergence and development of the “national security state,” with a focus on standard political economy phenomena of lobbying and interest aggregation in the executive and the legislature, spurred by current and past state officials who interact closely with the private sector.

Complementary arguments can be found in a final body of literature, this one in the field of international relations, on “securitization” (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2005; Vuori 2008; Donnelly 2013), the process whereby, because of mobilization motives and media reflexes, phenomena get reconstituted as security-related and, by implication, fall within the purview of state capabilities connected with national security.

Strictly speaking, none of these literatures makes the exact claim as the first part of the one articulated above, namely that there is a *long-term* tendency toward larger and more active national security apparatuses in democracies. In part, this is because some authors concentrate on the initial establishment of those apparatuses, more or less bracketing subsequent decades or treating them as more of the same. Other authors, notably Lasswell, are far more either-or, seeing democracies at some point as transforming into garrison states and at that point falling outside of their substantive concerns. For us, by contrast, democracies can at the very least find themselves with a significant national security sector that escapes democratic control; at most, democracies can gradually be colonized by their national security apparatuses while, at least for some decades, maintaining formally democratic status. To anticipate a point argued below, in these situations, entire realms of

policy making are largely uncontested; whether this is outbalanced sufficiently by contestation in other domains to still deserve the label “democratic” is to some degree a definitional issue.

There are two principal factors and two secondary ones that conduce to the long-term growth of national security apparatuses. First is fear. In his celebrated 1941 essay, Lasswell explicitly discussed what he called “the socialization of danger” as a hallmark of modern aerial warfare, pointing out that with civilians being threatened, “the nation becomes one unified technical enterprise” (459). Numerous authors have pointed out how fear dominated the politics of the United States not only after the USSR’s acquisition of nuclear weapons (e.g., Hogan 1998) but during World War II, because of concerns over fifth columns and, more generally, domestic groups deemed potentially subversive (e.g., Katznelson 2013: ch. 9).⁷ Fear is an equally important factor in other states, as incidents of domestic terrorism clearly show; note that this can be traced back at least as far as Lasswell’s first garrison state, i.e., Japan in the 1930s (Shillony 2000; Gordon 2003: chs. 10, 11).

The other principal factor is organizational inertia. Bureaucracies can be established for any number of reasons but, once set up, they tend to persist even after the initial reasons are seen to be no longer applicable. In part this is because of vested economic interests, interacting with lobbyists and policy intellectuals; it is also because the organization’s existence, with its capabilities for carrying out particular activities, provides a ready-to-hand tool that can be used to address—though not necessarily successfully—any number of policy problems (Sylvan and Majeski 2009). For example, even in the 1990s, when the Cold War had ended and the war on terror had not yet begun, U.S. foreign intelligence spending declined only slightly, remaining at a level 80 percent higher than in 1980; in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the CIA, which hardly had

⁷ Katznelson and Schurmann before him (1974: ch. 1) argue that abiding fears over physical security were twinned with worries over economic security (thus the UN Security Council was first envisaged under the same administration that pushed Congress to pass the Social Security Act).

distinguished itself in the preceding several years, was assigned by Bush the task of “hunting, capturing, imprisoning, and interrogating suspects around the world” (Weiner 2007: 481).⁸

Fear and organizational inertia operate together to result in a long-term trend toward larger and more active national security apparatuses but this effect is enhanced or attenuated by two secondary factors. Scholarship at the intersection of history and political science has pointed to the possession of overseas colonies or client states as a trigger for the development of security-related organizations (Morris-Suzuki 1998; Blanchard, Bancel, and Lemaire 2005; Lange 2009; McCoy 2009). If the same reasoning about trends in the national security state applies to agencies created in the colonial era, then what happened after the end of the Second World War was not so much the creation of new organizations but the continued existence of older ones, often repatriated, so to speak, from colonies or long-term clients to new foreign or domestic tasks. In addition, the nature of alliance ties (i.e., none, bilateral, or multilateral) should make a difference, via peer pressure, on the frequency and intensity of operational collaboration and, through that, of funding levels for the relevant agencies (see, e.g., Kreps 2010; Zaller 1994). Thus, to the two principal explanatory factors, we would add two secondary ones: possessing a colonial empire or long-term client states; and participating in bilateral or especially multilateral alliances (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 here

This discussion explains the basis for a research project that assesses the existence and extent of trends stretching over some 70 years: from the early days of the Cold War to the post-9/11 era with, ideally, an intermediate observation from the period when the Cold War was on the decline. It further implies that the project should be comparative in nature, examining trends within a number of democratic states (see below for a discussion of democracy), some of whom had colonial empires or long-standing client states in the early days of the Cold War and some of whom

⁸ Budgetary data from: <https://fas.org/irp/budget/>. As for Bush’s 17 September 2001 “finding” on interrogation, Mayer (2008: 38-41) points out that the document was in fact drafted by the head of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center. A related example of organizational “at-hand-edness” is the way in which the current Liberal government in Canada, though opposed to drone strikes, has nonetheless not eliminated the country’s air force from a precision weapons capability in the drones it is planning on buying: <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/trudeau-government-quietly-shopping-for-military-drones-in-the-midst-of-pressure-to-arm-them>.

did not. Similarly, there should be an examination of states without alliances, as well as those with bilateral and multilateral ones. This is already a major undertaking, even before we begin to specify the empirical materials used to carry out the research, and before going into details, it is worth noting the broader theoretical and substantive significance of the research.

In our view, it does. Theoretically, the project offers the possibility of bringing together research topics that have traditionally been separated or to some degree put on the back burner: military interventions, intelligence operations (both paramilitary activities and surveillance), military budgeting and the “military-industrial complex,” civil-military relations, secrecy, and, of course, the intersection between international relations and domestic politics. Substantively, the project addresses an issue that recurs throughout the post-1945 era: to what degree can democracy be maintained in the face of persistent threats? Whether we can begin to make a small contribution to answering this question is another issue, and it is that topic to which we now turn.

2. Democracy and legislative elite consensus

Both the garrison state concept and the trend argument above pertain to democracies. This may seem one-sided, given that the dominance of “specialists on violence” would presumably be characteristic of nondemocratic states. However, Lasswell’s original claim and the phenomena that seem to point to a general garrison state trend have to do with countries with large numbers of heterogeneous interest groups; high levels of literacy, political involvement, and technical expertise; and clear historical limits on the use of violence and the role of security-related agencies. It is in such countries that fear by elites and the mass public can serve as an impetus to the construction and growth of national security apparatuses, and it is also in such countries that interest intermediation and technical expertise are most likely to lead not only to organizational budget growth but to increased numbers of off-the-shelf activity capabilities within those organizations. By contrast, countries in which specialists on violence already dominate politics have tended to be significantly

less sensitive to fear (except, of course, that of losing power) and to be marked more by bureaucratic immobility than by increases in organizational capabilities. Thus, although military-dominated regimes certainly have allied themselves with democratic states for decades, particularly in the context of the Cold War or the post-9/11 anti-terrorist campaigns, they otherwise lack some of the key characteristics that would conduce to long-term garrison-state-style trends and so we will leave their study for a later project.

What is significant in the claim about democracies—specifically, representative democracies—is that the trends in question are largely self-inflicted. Since 1945, not a single democracy has been conquered or occupied by foreign invaders; all have functioning legislatures, reasonably free and contested elections, and an active news media. The construction of national security apparatuses was carried out by elected governments and it was those governments, with routine legislative approval year after year, which increased the size and scope of those apparatuses. Many, if not most, of the politicians who pushed through or voted for these various legislative measures did so in full knowledge that oversight would become difficult if not impossible and thus that their power over the bureaucracy would diminish (exactly the opposite situation in certain types of nondemocratic states); but they were convinced that security was at stake and that a current, or perhaps a future threat, mandated such action on their part. Even the political payoffs of their actions could hardly have been the principal motivation for most of the legislative votes since many of the activities in question were secret, with legislators being sworn to silence about their knowledge (which often was not very great) of those activities and even simple budget votes were dissimulated among dozens of fictitious accounts. This is not to deny phenomena such as red-baiting, khaki elections, and wrapping oneself in the flag, but although appeals to the mass public are certainly an element in the construction and expansion of national security apparatuses, the critical feature of democracy for our purposes is its representative quality.

This point about the role of legislative elites in the long-term security apparatus trend not only is a theoretical argument in itself but provides a potentially useful means of assessing the

validity of the claim about that trend. The problem is that there is no direct way of evaluating the claim systematically. Although data are certainly available on the size of countries' armed forces and on the money spent for those forces, analogous data for intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism spending are usually secret or only episodically released. The same goes for national security-related activities, many of which are only found out about years later, if at all. This means that cross-national over-time direct measures of the growth of national security apparatuses is not possible.

However, the role of legislative elites provides an indirect measure. Insofar as such elites increasingly agree on national security issues, they are likely to support funding for apparatuses charged with those issues; indeed, long-term growth in the size and activities of the apparatuses can only occur if there is an accompanying increase in elite agreement.⁹ That agreement is not only functional from a budgetary and legislative point of view but also serves as a cue to the mass media that particular policies or agencies play a key role in protecting national security, both because of what is said in speeches (see below) and because of what is not said in oversight hearings.¹⁰ On the other hand, there is no reason to expect that such increasing agreement among legislative elites will apply to other issue domains, and this offers a ready-made research design for assessing our core claim. If there is indeed long-term growth in the size and activities of national security apparatuses, with this trend being enabled and strengthened by legislative elites, then we should expect that over the decades, those elites will exhibit increasing agreement on national security issues as compared with other issues. In practice, this implies a within-country over-time assessment of elite agreement on three issue domains: national security, a domestic issue (we have opted for welfare spending),

⁹ We stress increased agreement among representative legislative elites, not simply continuation of a majority in favor of funding national security apparatuses and activities. Unless one cohesive political party completely dominates a country's politics from the end of World War II to the present, there will be alternation of power and thus an opportunity for those who had been on the losing side to shift funding to other issue domains.

¹⁰ For example, it is striking how rarely one finds significant oversight, much less challenges, to covert activities by even legislatures with considerable institutional power. Consider the oft-quoted response of Senator John Stennis, when asked by then-CIA director James Schlesinger if he wanted to be briefed on an upcoming operation: "No, no, my boy, don't tell me. Just go ahead and do it, but I don't want to know" (Johnson 2012: 151). See also Wetzling (2010) for predictable, but still striking, findings about the lack of oversight in Germany and the UK.

and a more “intermediate” domain having to do with other foreign policy issues (e.g., development assistance). The pattern we expect is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2 here

When we use the terms “agreement” and “consensus,” we do not mean unanimity. The point rather is that although elites may hold differing views on what to do in particular circumstances such as whether to commit troops in a given conflict, to fund a particular weapons program, or to authorize the collection of communications metadata, they see eye to eye on a number of issues surrounding those questions: what happened in the past, what is likely to happen in the future, what situations are good, or worrisome, or terrifying, and so forth. If, for example, legislative elites feel that certain leaders are “bad guys”—that therefore they pose a threat, that certain paramilitary programs have the potential to stop them, and that the officials running such programs are competent and well-meaning—then whatever their views on a particular legislative proposal, they are likely to fund those paramilitary programs and support their expansion in the face of new threats.

This part of our core claim implies that legislative elite consensus on national security issues grows significantly after World War II, plateauing at high levels near the end of the Cold War, or perhaps in the post-9/11 era. Such an inference may appear to run counter to a significant literature on elite polarization with respect to foreign policy issues, at least in the United States (e.g., McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; Meernik 1993; Prins and Marshall 2001; Souva and Rohde 2007; Beinart 2008). That literature, though, is not fundamentally at odds with our claim. The concept of consensus used here has to do with accord on world views, i.e., on deep assumptions about various phenomena such as foreign threats and the role played by various states. What happens, then, is that the range of agreement (including, crucially, on funding for and the activities of the national security apparatus) expands even as legislative elites vigorously disagree on certain policy alternatives. In this regard, standard means of determining polarization on contested issues, such as

survey data or roll call votes, are beside the point as regards deep assumptions on which legislative elites agree.

An informal example of growing consensus among legislative elites, and the way in which it can be used as an indicator of increasing size and activity of national security apparatuses, comes from earlier work we have done on the United States in the 1890s, the 1930s, the 1960s, the 1990s, and the early 2000s (Sylvan, Thornton, and Majeski 2014; Sylvan and Thornton 2015; Thornton and Sylvan 2015, 2016). In 1898–99, U.S. legislative elites were in major disagreement on the annexation of the Philippines and, more generally, on the U.S. role in the world. Although the annexationists won out, they did not win over their opponents, and over the next several decades disagreements arose on multiple occasions. As late as November 1939, when Congress finally agreed to repeal the Neutrality Act, isolationists denied that Hitler was a significant threat to the United States or that the U.S. had any interest in supporting Great Britain. Even after the war, during the debate over aid to Greece and Turkey, both left and right were deeply suspicious about the rationale for aid. Over the next two decades, this disagreement began to diminish and so, when the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was debated in 1964, its (two) opponents shared some premises with supporters about the U.S. role, even as they castigated both South Vietnam and the U.S. military. Thirty years later, in debates over the bombing of Kosovo and the authorization for invading Iraq, a genuine consensus had emerged, with both sides agreeing on the moral turpitude of Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein and of the importance of at least isolating, if not fighting against, them. Of course, this quick walk-through does not capture most of the details of the debates and the specific agreements or disagreements, nor does it say anything about the level of (dis)agreement on non-national security issues, but it does at least start to suggest that earlier efforts at building up national security apparatuses would have plateaued or been reversed, and that it was not until after World War II that our hypothesized long-term trend in fact began. This is exactly what happened, and while this in itself does not prove anything, it does indicate that growing legislative elite

consensus on national security, as opposed to other issues, can indeed be used as an indicator of a long-term trend toward larger and more active national security apparatuses.

By adding the point on long-term growth as being enabled and strengthened by consensus among legislative elites, we not only provide an indicator by which comparative research can be carried out but we also help address additional theoretical and substantive issues. One such issue is particularly worth highlighting, having to do with war and democracy. The extensive literature on the “democratic peace” carves out a partial exception to the correlation when it comes to covert interventions (e.g., Downes and Lilly 2010; Poznansky 2016), but fails to grapple with the larger issue raised by our core claim: that an extensive and growing array of activity have largely been removed from public debate. For example, the drone strikes referred to at the start of this paper, although discussed at some length in certain press outlets, have not been the object of sustained debate in Congress—not least because most documents and testimony are classified¹¹—and, as a result, have largely escaped becoming an issue in election campaigns (Horton 2015: ch. 8; Woods 2015: chs. 9, 12; Savage 2015: ch. 6). This raises questions about our knowledge of war-like activities (including the validity of standard conflict databases), about the scope conditions on theoretical claims about constraints on the executive, and, more fundamentally, about whether entire realms of policy making can be qualified as democratic in the first place. Ironically, Lasswell (1950) raised the possibility that the garrison state might be marked by a plebiscitary executive; what he did not perhaps reckon on is the possibility that consensus would be so strong among legislative elites as to obviate the need for even plebiscitary rituals.

3. Speeches as arguments

¹¹ “‘The collateral damage has been extraordinarily low,’ says Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the ranking member of the Senate’s Intelligence Committee. ‘That really is a fact. I only wish I could tell you what it was. That is the irony here. This is all classified.’” This and similar statements from Republicans, including presidential candidates, and even from liberal Democrats, are perfect examples of the blank zones on both war and democracy referred to above (<http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/04/congress-drone-strikes-are-here-stay/111067/>).

How can we study the presence, absence, or growth of legislative consensus on national security issues? Our proposal, as hinted at above, is to study legislative debates, specifically speeches made in the course of those debates, looking for agreement or disagreement on world views. As we indicated above, roll call votes tell us little about world views; speeches, on the other hand, give legislators' views, usually in their own words, and can be analyzed systematically to see the ways in which they overlap or differ. Below we will discuss our proposal to code speeches in terms of the arguments made in them, contrasting that approach with alternative ways of analyzing speeches. But before we address that issue, we need to put to rest one of the long-standing shibboleths in social science: that speeches are only "cheap talk" and thus can be discounted or even ignored.

In game theory, the reason that some kinds of talk are considered to be cheap is that engaging in them is not costly for those speaking or otherwise transmitting the message. This is the antithesis of what happens in legislative speeches, as they are one of the few means by which legislators' positions can be determined. Moreover, what matters both to legislators' supporters and opponents is not only their eventual vote on a bill (if there is indeed a bill that is voted on) but the words they use in announcing their vote: if a member of parliament says she is in favor of a resolution because other alternatives are worse, it is a very different message than praising the resolution as moral, or as leading to good consequences.

Another cheap talk criticism is that speeches simply fail to reflect what legislators actually think. This argument, too, fails to hold water. Legislators do not, in fact, evince significantly different beliefs in public than in private; their credibility as deal-makers is undermined if they articulate different beliefs from one day to the next. The fact that they carefully choose their words does not mean that they hold a different, "true," set of beliefs which could be articulated in some nonlinguistic fashion and, even if they were to display a high level of cynicism about their floor speeches (a phenomenon which actually is extremely rare among legislators), the fact that they have to ally with some members of parliament, oppose others, and stand for reelection, all on the basis of

what they say (and, of course, how they vote), means that the speeches, and not some other, nonexpressed, set of views, is what matters. Note that the need for allies and opponents suggests that instead of analyzing isolated speeches (say the kind given late at night, when there is no floor debate), we focus instead on speeches made in the course of debates on pending legislation.

There are a number of ways in which speeches can be analyzed. One can, for example, study them as expressing belief systems linked by logical entailment relations; as manifestations of underlying positions on multiple scales or “sentiments” on particular subjects; as focusing on particular “topics”; as a series of discursively connected utterances; or as an exercise in framing (Roseman 1994; Lowe et al. 2011; Thomas, Pang, and Lee 2006; Robert, Stewart, and Airoidi 2016; Cabrio, Tonelli, and Villata 2013; Chong and Druckman 2010). Our approach, instead, focuses on speeches as arguments, i.e., as a series of reasons advanced for taking a position, such as voting in favor of or against a particular legislative proposal. We hasten to add immediately that the arguments made by legislators may be logical or shot full of circularities and contradictions; solidly grounded in history or scientific studies or, on the contrary, based on a combination of fantasy or ignorance; positive or normative; high-minded or filled with ad hominem attacks and personal slurs. But whatever the specific points made, every speech is an argument of sorts, and our proposal is to characterize each argument so as to determine what it shares with other arguments put forward in the same legislative context, i.e., the debate in which the speech is made. If, as we will discuss below, the zone of agreement for particular issue areas expands over time, we can say that there is a move in the direction of consensus.

Here is some terminology. A *claim* is a speaker’s position on an issue; here, a pending vote on a bill or resolution.¹² A *reason* is a point made in support, whether directly or indirectly, of a claim. A reason that supports a claim directly (so that we could represent the role of reason X in the

¹² As noted above, legislators can and do announce their positions on issues which are not the subject of pending votes, but although some parliaments set aside time for members to make speeches of that sort, this is not universal. Hence we have opted for speeches on pending measures, even if the measure may not yet have been introduced formally or if, on the contrary, it ends up being withdrawn for redrafting or in the face of opposition. Similarly, for reasons of tractability, we ignore speeches on amendments unless the amendment is in effect a proposal to kill the bill (“strike the rest of the text”) or if it sparks a major debate on its own.

speech, say, as “vote for the bill because of X”) is a *core reason*; a reason that supports a core reason (hence, for reason Y, “vote for the bill because of X and X because of Y”) is a *secondary reason*. There can be multiple core reasons in a speech and also multiple secondary reasons in support of a given core reason; there can also be a secondary reason in support of another secondary reason, with the latter in support of a core reason. A *reasoning chain* is a claim supported by a core reason which in turn is supported by at least one secondary reason and, recursively, any secondary reasons in support of the latter. At the minimum, then, reasoning chains are composed of three connected elements, a claim, a core reason, and a secondary reason; but if the latter is in turn supported by one or more secondary reasons, the reasoning chain may be composed of four, five, or more connected elements. As we will discuss below, two chains in a speech may start out with the same core reason in support of the claim and the same immediately supporting secondary reason in support of the core, then, further down, as it were, diverge into different supporting secondary reasons. Such *compound* chains may, for purposes of pairwise similarity assessment, be treated as composed of multiple individual chains. In Figure 3, for example, there are four individual reasoning chains:

Figure 3 here

two *simple* chains, one linking C to B and the other linking F to E to D; and one compound chain with an individual chain linking I to H to G and another individual chain linking J to H to G.¹³

Finally, the *argument* made in a speech is the combination of the claim and all the reasoning chains supporting it.¹⁴

¹³ Chains may be interconnected not only because they all lead to the same claim (this is trivially the normal case, although there are speeches in which more than one claim is made [e.g., to vote in favor of something and also to be wary of something else in the future]), but because they may be so-called “divergent structures” (Freeman 1991) in which a given secondary reason is used in support of more than one “higher” reason. We do not discuss such chains here because they pose no particular issues for coding or similarity assessment, though, interestingly, they are not permitted in many kinds of argument mapping software (since they are not, mathematically speaking, trees).

¹⁴ Terminological notes. The phrase “reasoning chain,” as we use it, overlaps to some degree with its use in political science and in computational linguistics (e.g., Sniderman et al. 1986; Sizov and Öztürk 2013). Our concept of “argument” is similar, though not identical, to the first two meanings discussed by Hornikx and Hahn (2012); it is definitely not as differentiated in its notion of “support” as Toulmin’s (1958) canonical model or as limited to direct responses as Rescher’s (1978) notion of a back and forth between two different persons.

Consider now the relations between reasoning chains. As indicated above, chains may not only differ in their content but appear to many observers to be contradictory: for example, “vote against the resolution because the Soviets are aggressive; they are aggressive because Stalin made a speech calling for supporting revolutions” and also “vote against the resolution because the Soviets are trying to lull us to sleep; they are trying to lull us to sleep because Stalin made a speech calling for peace and negotiations with us.” An argument can be composed of chains which are mutually inconsistent; the only consistency criterion we have been able to discover is that the type of connections between reasons in a particular chain must be the same sort (e.g., historical, or legal; see below for a discussion).

Representing speeches as arguments along the lines proposed above offers a tractable and systematic way of seeing just how much agreement there across speeches. For example, consider the quotations on waterboarding drawn from different political elites in the United States and displayed in Appendix 1.¹⁵ An informal look at the quotations suggests that Bush's reasoning is similar to that of his vice president; that McCain and Clinton agree in some respects; and that Trump partly tracks Bush and Cheney while going further in other regards. These intuitions can be checked through coding the statements as arguments, using the methodology laid out below. Appendix 2 lists all the reasons used in the statements, as well as the reasoning chains which connect them in the arguments; the chains should be read across in this fashion: S-3-5 means support the claim because of reason 3 and support reason 3 because of reason 5.¹⁶

Thus our proposal is to analyze speeches as arguments, to code those arguments into their component reasoning chains, to assess the agreement between the arguments in a given debate, and then to see whether, over time, national security debates show significantly greater increases in agreement than do debates on other issues, as well as whether that increased agreement is magnified

¹⁵ Note that only one of the statements (Cheney's) was part of a speech, although another one—the McCain press release—reflected what he said on the Senate floor. Bush's statement was drawn from his memoirs, which were presumably drafted with some concern for consistency. It should also be noted that Clinton's statement to some degree contradicted another statement made years before when she was still in the Senate: <http://www.democraticunderground.com/1251711013>.

¹⁶ If the claim were to be opposed, the string would begin with O. For reasons of legibility, in this example we have omitted the types of connections discussed in the next section.

or attenuated by depending on colonial and alliance status. We now turn to a discussion of our methodology for coding speeches into arguments, and for assessing agreement between arguments in a debate.

4. Coding speeches into arguments

There are a number of issues involved in the coding of speeches; our intention here is not to go into most of the logistical and mechanical details, but to give a sense of the overall logic of the enterprise. While the methodology we discuss has been developed for the specific research project we are conducting, as a way to get at the core claim about whether democracies are marked by long-term tendencies to become garrison states, we stress that many of the procedures we have adopted are applicable to any number of research questions for which one would like to analyze speeches.

To begin with, it should be noted that we have coded speeches by hand rather than using automated methods involving parsers. Although reliable means now exist for extracting affect from speeches (e.g., Young and Soroka 2012) or for parsing speeches to ascertain ideology or topic (e.g., Slapin and Proksch 2014), such methods run into major problems when confronted with deixis (words and phrases whose meaning is context-specific) or with so-called dog whistle politics (i.e., the use of certain expressions which will be interpreted in a savvy way by the target audience while being ignored by other audiences).¹⁷ These same problems are, as one would expect, stronger when it comes to extracting reasons and chains, not least because entailment connectors such as “because” or “for example” are often not explicit in the text. One of the standard ways of circumventing these difficulties is “training” the computer program to modify off-the-shelf

¹⁷ The canonical example is the late Lee Atwater, a Republican Party operative who, when interviewed in 1981, explained how politicians appealed to Southern white voters over time: “You start out in 1954 by saying, ‘Nigger, nigger, nigger.’ By 1968 you can’t say ‘nigger’—that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now [1981] you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.” <http://www.thenation.com/article/170841/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy>.

lexicons, inference rules, and so forth by hand-coding representative portions of the text. This approach, though, does not work in the debates we are studying, since each debate is usually only around 30–40 speeches long and has its own deictic vocabulary, meaning that there simply is not enough material in one debate to train the parser for the rest of that debate, much less for the training to be of use in any other debates. This problem also means that automating even less demanding coding tasks, such as creating paraphrases, is, at least for now, not feasible.

Of course, because hand coding is time consuming, it means that we are, in effect, restricted to a single debate per issue domain per time period per country. To make up for this, we have chosen debates (sometimes in both the upper and lower house of the legislature) which involved a significant number of speakers and/or fairly lengthy speeches on both sides; in which a number of reasons were advanced; and for which the issue seemed genuinely contested. We were not looking for close votes, partly because closeness of votes does not correlate highly with extent of arguments, partly because few legislators change their mind during debates, and partly because it is clear early on what the final vote will be in many cases, which means that it is the true believers who elaborate arguments and drag out the debate.

The basic information unit is the speech. Some legislators spoke multiple times and, if they did so on separate days, we would consider each speech as separate. Coders take a speech (sometimes screening out responses to interruptions) and paraphrase it, paragraph by paragraph and sentence by sentence. In turn, paraphrases are summarized, paragraph by paragraph, into one or a handful of sentences, with points implied but not made explicitly (e.g., who is being attacked or what the point of a sentence may be) added in brackets. All paraphrases and summaries, regardless of the language of the debate, are in English so that regular reliability checks can be carried out with coders who do not know the language if the debate was not in English.

Once the summaries were created, each summary paragraph is coded into reasons. Since the reasons, and indeed the terminology, differs massively from one country to another, one issue area to another, and notably one debate to another, the coding of reasons is done bottom-up: coders look

at each sentence or phrase (if the sentence is long or complicated) of a summary paragraph (including sentences or phrases in brackets) and figure out how it could be used directly or indirectly as explanation for an anticipated vote. So far, we have found that summary paragraphs run between 1 and 4 sentences and that there can be anywhere from 0 reasons to 4 reasons in a paragraph. Reasons may be of various sorts; they can be recycled from one paragraph to the next, as well as reused from another speech.

After every summary paragraph in a speech has been coded into reasons, coders make another pass, this time through the reasons for the first paragraph, then the reasons for the second paragraph, etc. For each paragraph, coders attempt to construct reasoning chains from the reasons in that paragraph, proceeding reason by reason and trying to construct a chain for each one. Specifically, for each reason X and some other reason Y in that paragraph or in a preceding one (if there seems to be a reference to it), coders try out a chain of the sort S-X-Y or S-Y-X (or O-X-Y or O-Y-X, if the claim is being opposed). If the proposed chain appears to make sense in terms of the summary, it is retained, otherwise it is discarded. Retained chains are then looked at a second time to see if they can be tacked on to each other (say if S-X-Y and S-X-Z should be written instead S-X-Y-Z). As with the coding of reasons, there will be some paragraphs where there are multiple chains, some where there is only one, and some where there are none.

In abducing reasoning chains, we build in a consistency check via the types of connections mentioned above. Each reason is connected to other reasons, or to the claim, by a “because.” These *connectors*, as we call them, are subdivided by type: 1) L: legal or conceptual/definitional (e.g., “we can’t do X because it would be unconstitutional”); 2) H: historical (e.g., “we should do it because we’ve done it before”); 3) C: consequential (including slippery slope arguments) of the sort X occurs, triggering Y (e.g., “if we do X, it will put the budget into deficit”); 4) N: normative (e.g., “we can’t do X because it’s immoral to treat people in that way”); 5) A: anthropological (e.g., “we should do X because it’s the only kind of language people like Y understand”); and 6) I: identity/who we are or are not (e.g., “we shouldn’t do X because we’re a democracy, not a

dictatorship”).¹⁸ Connectors are first posited, for a particular reasoning chain, for the link between the “lowest” secondary reason and the reason “above” it which it supports. If there is more than one “lowest” secondary reason supporting a reason one level up, then a connector is posited for each of the links. Moving up one level, the connector between the second-lowest and the third-lowest level must be the same as one of the lower-level types, and so on all the way up. Thus, if there is a single lowest connector of type A, the second-to-lowest connector and all higher ones for that chain must also be A; if there is a compound chain with two lowest connectors, one of type A and the other of type H, the second-to-lowest connector must be either A or H and, whichever it is, all higher connectors must be the same, i.e., all A or all H. Violation of this criterion is indicative of either a missing reason (see below) or a miscoded one.¹⁹

Once chains are constructed for each paragraph, coders make a third pass through the paragraphs and dichotomize the chains by whether or not a given reason is used more than once in a given speech. If so, then the reason is kept; if not, it is either deleted or recoded, if its content warrants, as another reason and the chains of which it is part rewritten accordingly. Chains with kept reasons are categorized as *primary chains*; chains with discarded reasons are categorized as *secondary chains*, the rationale being that they are not the principal components of a speech’s argument (they are a one-off, or a tangent).

For a sense of the coding process, it is helpful to look at Appendix 3. It codes a paragraph from a speech made in the parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany in February 1952 about the proposal to set up a European Defense Community. This particular speech is by Linus Kather, who at that point was a member of Chancellor Adenauer’s Christian Democrats while also being a spokesman for Germans who had been expelled from territories in the East. In the particular paragraph shown in Appendix 3, Kather is in the middle of an extortion attempt, indicating that

¹⁸ This list of connectors was put together after provisionally coding a number of speeches in the U.S. Senate debate over Philippines annexation (Thornton and Sylvan 2015); subsequent coding of speeches in the research project may lead to additions.

¹⁹ To be clear, we are not saying that reasons have to be linked into chains by strict logical consistency but simply that the form of reasoning in a chain is locally homogeneous: speakers may and often do contradict themselves, but if a particular bit of reasoning is heterogeneous, it is not usually grasped by listeners as a single argument.

after he votes for the bill, he will expect the government to grant compensation for displaced Germans and that if they do not, there will be chaos of the sort Adenauer is blaming the Soviets for trying to foment. The summary of the paragraph was coded as containing three reasons (the numbering is from the speech as a whole, hence the higher and nonconsecutive numbers) and two of those three were then coded as part of a reasoning chain (remember that C is a type of connector, in this case, a “because” that works via consequences); the third reason is not part of a chain because while it certainly is a reason to support the bill, there is no secondary reason supporting it, at least in this paragraph.

5. Assessing agreement between arguments

Once speeches have been coded as arguments made up of chains abduced from speeches, their similarity can be assessed to permit the degree of agreement, for a particular debate, to be determined. This is still work in progress, so the discussion in this paper is preliminary. Nonetheless, a few comments are in order.

When we refer to agreement in a debate, what we have in mind is that the proponents and the opponents of the measure under consideration reason the same way, even if they ultimately arrive at opposite conclusions. Here an analogy is helpful. Think of reasoning chains as something like a route one takes from a starting point to an ending point: say that one is going from a starting point, such as a location in a particular city, to a destination, say a location in another city (we might imagine that proponents start at a football stadium while opponents begin their journey at an art museum). Then the route would describe the transit points along the way (akin to core and secondary reasons) as well as the means of transportation (roughly akin to types of connector). An argument would be a collection of routes, and calculating the extent of agreement between any two arguments would involve determining how many modifications—adding a route, deleting a route, altering a route's transit points and/or means of transportation—would be necessary to transform

one collection into the other. Arguments which are very similar to each other require few such modifications; dissimilar arguments need numerous modifications. By extension, agreement between the two sides in a given debate would involve determining how many modifications would be necessary to transform the "average" collection of routes on one side into its counterpart on the other side.²⁰

Consider now the issue of modifying an argument to transform it into another. Here we need to know two things: what the differences are between any two reasoning chains, in order to have an idea about the number of modifications for one chain to be the same as the other; and what the differences are in the two arguments, considered as wholes. That latter is not simply a matter of adding up or averaging the former across all chains, because a mechanical set of pairwise comparisons between chains in two incredibly long speeches (say with each speech having several dozen chains) is drastically lower levels of argument-to-argument agreement merely as a function of the number of possible pairwise comparisons. Thus we need not only chain-to-chain measures of agreement but argument-to-argument ones. We are still working out criteria for the latter issue; here we report on our approach to the former issue.

How to compare two reasoning chains? Our intuition, drawn to some degree from sociological work on “optimal matching” algorithms for event sequences, is that if two reasoning chains have the same reasons in the same positions, as well as the same types of connectors between reasons, they are similar (they are not necessarily identical, because we are assessing summaries, not the exact words or references in particular speeches).²¹ If, however, a pair of chains shares two

²⁰ We would also have to strip off the starting point for each collection in order to take account of the fact that the two sides are making opposing claims.

²¹ The idea behind optimal matching is that two sequences are similar in inverse proportion to the number of “edits” that would be necessary to transform one into the other (Abbott 1990 is the original piece; there are numerous extensions, such as Dijkstra and Taris 1995; Robette and Bry 2012; and Elzinga and Studer 2015; the single strongest critique remains that of Wu 2000). Although there are numerous problems with this idea for studies of event sequences (e.g., a life course or a career trajectory), from our perspective, reasoning chains with certain reasons in common are similar precisely insofar as they are in the “proper” order and with the same elements. In other words, even if reasoning chains cannot meaningfully be transformed by such edits, the idea underlying an edit—that a change in reasons or in order moves one away from similarity—still makes sense. However, because even small differences in reasoning can make for big differences in outcome (cf. the extensive literature on the importance of question wording in survey design), we measure similarity on an ordinal, not an interval, scale: reasoning chains are similar, partly similar, or dissimilar. The basic idea of comparing reasons, though not yet chains, was first used by Thornton (2014) in a study of arguments about cutbacks in the welfare state.

reasons linked by the same type of connectors, but one chain has either a) one or more secondary reasons not contained by the other chain²² or b) one or more secondary reasons in a different order than in the other chain, then we will say that the chains are partly similar. Finally, if a pair of chains has either a) zero or one reasons in common or b) different types of connectors,²³ the pair is dissimilar.

We are well aware that this discussion, even more than the preceding one on coding reasons and chains, is technical. However, given the large number of speeches we are looking at and the even larger number of reasoning chains coded across all speeches, some type of explicit and systematic procedure is necessary both for bookkeeping purposes and to avoid the kinds of availability heuristics that are prevalent in both political debates and discussions of them (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; Levy 2013; Taleb 2010). The garrison state hypothesis is important enough theoretically and substantively to warrant careful assessment.

A final note, more in the nature of a progress report than a discussion of results. As mentioned above, the garrison state project currently involves hand coding over 1800 speeches (5 persons are currently at work on the project). Our hope is to have initial, highly preliminary results within 6 months and more robust, though still preliminary, findings a year from now.

²² Unless there are two secondary reasons with only the intermediate secondary reason differing; in that case, on the logic that the speaker could have included that intermediate reason, we treat the chains as similar.

²³ Our sense is that connectors bear on the mode of reasoning, so they should count heavily in determining agreement.

Figure 1
Explaining long-term growth in
national security apparatuses



Figure 2
Expected patterns of agreement
on national security versus other issues





Figure 3
Four reasoning chains



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Appendix 1

Statements on waterboarding

1. Cheney (2008)

“The military has interrogated terrorists held at Guantanamo Bay. And in addition, a small number of terrorists, high-value targets, held overseas have gone through an interrogation program run by the CIA. It's a tougher program, for tougher customers. These include Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11. He and others were questioned at a time when another attack on this country was believed to be imminent. It's a good thing we had them in custody, and it's a good thing we found out what they knew.

“The procedures of the CIA program are designed to be safe, and they are in full compliance with the nation's laws and treaty obligations. They've been carefully reviewed by the Department of Justice, and very carefully monitored. The program is run by highly trained professionals who understand their obligations under the law. And the program has uncovered a wealth of information that has foiled attacks against the United States; information that has saved thousands of lives.

“The United States is a country that takes human rights seriously. We do not torture—it's against our laws and against our values. We're proud of our country and what it stands for. We expect all of those who serve America to conduct themselves with honor. And we enforce those rules. Some years ago, when abuses were committed at Abu Ghraib prison, a facility that had nothing to do with the CIA program, the abuses that came to light were, in fact, investigated, and those responsible were prosecuted. ...”

<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cheney-defends-us-use-of-waterboarding/>

2. Bush (2010)

“CIA experts drew up a list of interrogation techniques. ... At my direction, Department of Justice and CIA lawyers conducted a careful legal review. The enhanced interrogation program complied with the Constitution and all applicable laws, including those that ban torture.

“There were two that I felt went too far, even if they were legal. I directed the CIA not to use them. Another technique was waterboarding, a process of simulated drowning. No doubt the procedure was tough, but medical experts assured the CIA that it did no lasting harm.”

Though Bush confirms that he knew the use of waterboarding would one day become public, and acknowledges that it is “sensitive and controversial,” he asserts that “the choice between security and values was real,” and expresses firm confidence in his decision. “Had I not authorized waterboarding on senior al Qaeda leaders, I would have had to accept a greater risk that the country would be attacked. In the wake of 9/11, that was a risk I was unwilling to take,” he writes.

Bush further declares that the new techniques proved effective, yielding information on al Qaeda's structure and operations, and leading to the capture of Ramzi bin al Shibh, the logistical planner of the 9/11 attacks who was captured on the first anniversary of 9/11.

And if there were any lingering doubts or conflict about the use of waterboarding, Bush discloses that he received reassurance from an unlikely source: terror suspect Abu Zubaydah.

The former president writes, “His understanding of Islam was that he had to resist interrogation only up to a certain point. Waterboarding was the technique that allowed him to reach that

threshold, fulfill his religious duty, and then cooperate.” Bush elaborates that Zubaydah gave him a direct instruction, “‘You must do this for all the brothers.’”

Intelligence gleaned from interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and other suspects led to the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Bush writes. During a raid on Mohammed's compound, agents discovered more plans for terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

Prompted by the discoveries, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet asked if he had permission to use enhanced interrogation techniques including waterboarding on Mohammed.

Bush exposes his inner thoughts on what led him to reach this decision: “I thought about my meeting with Danny Pearl's widow, who was pregnant with his son when he was murdered. I thought about the 2,971 people stolen from their families by al Qaeda on 9/11. And I thought about my duty to protect my country from another act of terror.

'Damn right,' I said.”

<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/11/05/bush.book/>

3. McCain (2016)

“Given the loose talk on the campaign trail about reviving waterboarding and other inhumane interrogation techniques, it is important to remember the facts: that these forms of torture not only failed their purpose to secure actionable intelligence to prevent further attacks on the U.S. and our allies, but compromised our values, stained our national honor, and did little practical good. It is also important to remember that our nation has tried, convicted, and executed foreign combatants who employed methods of torture, including waterboarding, against American prisoners of war. As I have said before, our nation should never have employed such practices in the past, and we should never permit them in the future.

“There is broad, bipartisan agreement on this fundamental question. Last year, the United States Senate passed in an overwhelming vote of 91–3 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, legislation that took a historic step forward to ban torture once and for all by limiting U.S. Government interrogation techniques to those in the Army Field Manual. The Manual embodies the values Americans have embraced for generations—preserving the ability of our interrogators to extract critical intelligence from our adversaries while recognizing that torture and cruel treatment are ineffective interrogation methods. Some of the nation’s most respected leaders from the U.S. military, CIA, FBI, as well as faith communities and human rights organizations, have expressed their support for this legislation.

“As Americans of conscience we must remember that in the war on terrorism, we are fighting not only to defend our security, but for an idea that all men are endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights. How much safer the world would be if all nations believed the same. How much more dangerous it can become when we forget it ourselves even momentarily, as we learned in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib. Our nation needs a Commander-in-Chief who will make clear to those that fight on our behalf that they are defending this sacred ideal, and that sacrificing our respect for human dignity will make it harder, not easier, to prevail in this war.”

<http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=6044CE90-20F1-4823-A126-C03D5F770565>

4. Clinton (2014)

“Today we can say again in a loud and clear voice, the United States should never condone or practice torture anywhere in the world,” Clinton said.

The former secretary of state, accepting an award from the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, acknowledged that Americans are frustrated by the country’s “division and polarization” that often seems to block progress.

“That should be absolutely clear as a matter of both policy and law, including our international treaty obligations, and if that requires new legislation, then Congress should work with President Obama to quickly enact it and it shouldn't be an issue of partisan politics,” Clinton said of eliminating the use of torture techniques.

“America is at our best when our actions match our values,” she said.

Clinton said she was “proud” to be part of the Obama administration noting brutal interrogation tactics such as waterboarding were banned with a 2009 executive order.

“Yes, the threat of terrorism is real and urgent, scores of children were just murdered in Pakistan, beheadings in the Middle East, a siege in Sydney, these tragedies not only break hearts but should steel our resolve and underscore that our values are what set us apart from our adversaries,” Clinton said.

<http://abcnews.go.com/US/hillary-clinton-speaks-us-torture/story?id=27654296>

5. Trump (2015)

“Would I approve waterboarding? You bet your ass I would—in a heartbeat,” Trump said to loud cheers during a rally at a convention center here Monday night that attracted thousands. “And I would approve more than that. Don't kid yourself, folks. It works, okay? It works. Only a stupid person would say it doesn't work.”

Trump said such techniques are needed to confront terrorists who “chop off our young people's heads” and “build these iron cages, and they'll put 20 people in them and they drop them in the ocean for 15 minutes and pull them up 15 minutes later.”

“It works,” Trump said over and over again. “Believe me, it works. And you know what? If it doesn't work, they deserve it anyway, for what they're doing. It works.”

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/11/23/donald-trump-on-waterboarding-if-it-doesnt-work-they-deserve-it-anyway/>

Appendix 2

Reasoning chains for waterboarding

Claim: Blanket prohibition on waterboarding

Reasons

01 Waterboarding is good

02 Prisoners talk

03 Waterboarding is not torture

04 Waterboarding is safe

05 Prisoners deserve to be waterboarded

06 Waterboarding is torture

07 Waterboarding is bad

08 Prisoners lie

09 Waterboarding stains our reputation

10 Waterboarding is contrary to our values

11 US should never condone waterboarding

12 US follows international law

Reasoning chains

Cheney

O-1-2

O-3-4

Bush

O-1-2

O-3-4

McCain

S-7-8

S-9-10

Clinton

S-11-12
S-9-10

Trump

O-1-2
O-5-6

Appendix 3

Example of a coded paragraph (paragraph 9 of Kather's speech, 8 February 1952)

1. Paraphrase

We do not want to take things lightly. The “Zeit” wrote once that the expellees are “pawns in Stalin’s game.” Mr. Chancellor listed yesterday which covered operations are in place to undermine our organizations. Especially we can observe such things. They are conducting West German refugee conferences, they founded a special refugee magazine that is distributed very cheaply, they offer themselves as comrades to trekking associations, and they try to undermine all other organizations. Thus, I believe that if we have to make this decision in a few months, it should be proved until then, especially through the finalization of the compensation law, that it is not only words, but that one is ready to give to this group that is in the shadows so far what they deserve so they can wholeheartedly defend the common home.

2. Summary

Adenauer stressed yesterday the covert Soviet operations to undermine our organizations. We are aware of their many efforts to do this. Only a compensation law can counteract Soviet subversive activities and create the real commitment in displaced Germans to defend the common home.

3. Reasons

Reason 14: If displaced Germans don't get compensation, they'll upset the social order

Reason 11: We will use our support for the bill to get compensation for displaced Germans

Reason 17: Compensation will win hearts and minds of displaced Germans

4. Chains

Claim: Support the bill

Chain: S-C-11-C-14