Has Foreign Policy Become More Consensual?
Measuring Ideology Over Time

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Abstract

The advent of the "national security state" has arguably had profound consequences for agreement among political elites regarding countries' foreign policies: as perceived threats have continued/grown, and as bureaucracies created to deal with those threats have become institutionalized, including long-standing cooperative arrangements between different countries' security agencies, the national security sector has arguably become increasingly insulated from rancorous political debates. To test this proposition as part of an ongoing research project, we develop a methodology for measuring ideological consensus among political elites regarding both national security-related issues and other issues. The methodology works by coding speeches in political debates as sets of argument chains; pairs of the latter are then compared and a similarity measure (related to sociological work on the similarity of event sequences) is calculated and aggregated across pairs of speeches. A preliminary application of the methodology to portions of a debate arguably prior to the advent of the national security state -- over the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which annexed the Philippines to the United States -- reveals that the methodology is tractable (suggesting that the approach can be scaled up to study more recent debates in multiple countries) and, as a measurement device, seems to track the level of the national security state.

One of the noteworthy characteristics of political debates about surveillance in the two years

since Edward Snowden's revelations about the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) has been the

realization, in one country after another, that such surveillance is carried out by each country's own

agencies, that the surveillance has been going on for some time, and that it is on a wider scale than

had previously been suspected. What is also noteworthy is that, notwithstanding this realization, the

majority reaction among political elites has been that although some correctives may well be

needed, the world is simply too dangerous to forgo these tools. Thus, in the United States, a mild

reform of the NSA that nonetheless continued, directly or indirectly, its data collection programs,

passed the Congress overwhelmingly and was signed immediately into law.[1] In France, a bill

expanding surveillance powers is in the process of passing both chambers by large margins. Similar

legislation has either already been voted or is in the process of being approved by the parliaments of

other countries, with even the Swiss doing the same.[2] In sum, while Snowden's documents may well

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[1] The reaction by the former head of the NSA to the congressional vote was "If somebody would come up to me andsay
'Look, Hayden, here's the thing: This Snowden thing is going to be a nightmare for you guys for about two years.And
when we get all done with it, what you're going to be required to do is that little 215 program about American
telephony metadata — and by the way, you can still have access to it, but you got to go to the court and get access to it
from the companies, rather than keep it to yourself' — I go: 'And this is it after two years? Cool!'"
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/06/17/hayden-mocks-extent-post-snowden-surveillance-reform-2-years-cool/

[2] For example, the UK parliament expanded surveillance in 2014 (http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/14/uk-emergency-
surveillance-law-blow-privacy) and was described as "likely to be satisfied" if future legislation were to embody the
recommendations of a new watchdog report: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/11/uk-intelligence-agencies-
should-keep-mass-surveillance-powers-report-gchq. In France, both houses of parliament have now passed versions of a
new law expanding surveillance: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/france-passes-new-surveillance-law-
in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-attack and http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2015/0609/France-moves-closer-to-
adopting-expansive-surveillance-law. In Switzerland, a bill expanding surveillance was approved by the lower house of
parliament in the spring (http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/37d03a12-cc8f-11e4-ab43-
77e6948b78b0/Loi_sur_le_Renseignement_la_gauche_ne_parvient_pas_%C3%A0_la_corriger) and, in a matter
somewhat more favorable still to the intelligence services, by the upper house: http://www.tdg.ch/suisse/autorite-
independante-doit-surveiller-services-secrets/story/12889918.

have sparked a focus on surveillance, they have not for the most part led to significant restrictions on the agencies engaging in those activities.

Obviously, these political reactions raise numerous questions about government secrecy, the mass media, and representative democracy; for our purposes, however, they also hint at a methodology for studying the phenomenon of the "national security state": to ascertain its scope across countries; its growth, or lack thereof, over time; and the extent to which these spatial and temporal patterns can be accounted for by various causal factors. This paper is on that methodology. We begin by a quick overview of the literature on the national security state, adducing hypotheses about its growth and its cross-national variation. We then propose an indirect way of measuring the extent of the national security state by looking at ideological consensus among political elites on national security-related issues; one measure of that consensus, we argue, can be found in commonalities of reasoning in otherwise highly contested legislative debates. We discuss the coding of speeches in those debates as argument chains and criteria (related to sociological work on event sequences) for assessing the similarity of pairs of argument chains. We conclude with a preliminary application of our methodology to a particular legislative debate; it suggests that the methodology is promising enough to undergird a large-scale research project (now underway) on the growth and extent of the national security state.

1. The national security state

There are several political science literatures arguing that there should be a significant expansion of state capabilities connected with national security. The oldest of these -- although there has been a revival of work in just the last few years (e.g., Engel 2011; Morgan 2004; Friedberg 2000) -- stems from the evocative argument by the political scientist Harold Lasswell about the "garrison state" (Lasswell 1937, 1941, 1950, 1962; earlier revivals are, e.g., Aron 1979; Fitch 1985). Lasswell's original focus, and that of most scholars who have revived his ideas, was on

a structural tendency (due to the interaction between an at least initial sense of threat among officials electorally responsible to public opinion, on the one hand, and organizational inertia [Sylvan and Majeski 2009] in government bureaucracies, on the other) in democratic countries for "specialists on violence" to play an ever greater political role. That "developmental construct," as Lasswell termed the tendency, goes along with a second strand of literature, this on institutional political development (Katznelson and Shefter 2002: pt. 4; Sparrow 2011; Thorpe 2014). The argument here is that, at least for the USA, state building dynamics in the mid-20th century were particularly concentrated in agencies having to do with issues of national security. These political science arguments are buttressed by additional work by legal scholars and diplomatic historians (Hogan 1998; Stuart 2008; Ackerman 2010), on the emergence and development of the "national security state," with a focus on standard political economy phenomena of lobbying and interest aggregation in the executive and the legislature, spurred by current and past state officials who interact closely with the private sector. Complementary arguments can be found in a final body of literature, this one in the field of international relations, on "securitization" (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2005; Vuori 2008; Donnelly 2013), the process whereby, because of mobilization motives and media reflexes, phenomena get reconstituted as security-related and, by implication, fall within the purview of state capabilities connected with national security.

On these arguments, we should expect a long-term tendency in democracies with incipient national security bureaucracies and significant financial resources, for the latter to grow in both size and influence, as well as in the scope of their activities, both at home and abroad. We thus have a first hypothesis, *(H1) that for democratic, developed countries, there should be long-term tendencies in the direction of a national security state.*

However, there are other factors at work which can magnify or attenuate these tendencies. Scholarship at the intersection of history and political science has pointed to the possession of overseas colonies or client states as a trigger for the development of security-related organizations (Morris-Suzuki 1998; Blanchard, Bancel, and Lemaire 2005; Lange 2009; McCoy 2009); and if the

same reasoning about trends in the national security state applies to agencies created in the colonial era, then what happened after the end of the Second World War was not so much the creation of new organizations as the continued existence of older ones. Thus*, H2: countries with overseas empires in 1945 should display proportionately greater development of a national security state than those without empires (though this effect may diminish with the advent of decolonization).*[3] A second alternative explanation has to do with multilateral alliances. As we mentioned above, recently published documents leaked from within the NSA point to significant differences in collaboration between the agency and its foreign counterparts, and specifically to the extent to which each would pass information to the other. Arguably, these collaborations, and by extension the development of surveillance and related capacities, covary with the extent of military and other intelligence ties (*El Mundo* 30 Oct. 2013; *Copenhagen Post* 4 Nov. 2013, both reporting on cooperation between the NSA and counterpart agencies in other countries); when the ties are multilateral in nature, peer pressure on national security issues should be particularly strong and notably influence the world views of a member country's elites (see, e.g., Kreps 2010; Zaller 1994). *Hence, H3: countries which are members of multilateral alliances should display proportionately greater development of a national security state than those who are either neutrals or only have bilateral military alliances.*

2. Ideological consensus

The problem with the above hypotheses, as with many of the trend claims made in various literatures about the national security state, is that they are practically impossible to assess

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[3] Note two things about this hypothesis and the next, as well as about all three recast hypotheses below: first, they are about changes within countries over time, i.e., we are not comparing levels across countries; and second, the magnification hypotheses are in addition to the underlying trend, i.e., they do not set the initial levels of the national security state higher, with subsequent years being characterized by regression toward the mean tendencies (this second point is readily apparent for H3, but the consequences for H2 is similar: colonial bureaucracies first are repatriated into national police, then are transferred to national security tasks).

systematically. Although data are certainly available on the size of countries' armed forces and on the money spent for those forces, many of the phenomena pointed to in the literatures -- the political and administrative role of "specialists on violence"; the routinized references to threats in the mass media; and, especially after the Snowden revelations about the NSA, the size, spending, and scope of intelligence and surveillance agencies -- are either so multi-faceted, or so secret, as to make it impossible for comparative cross-sectional or longitudinal data sets to be constructed. However, what can be done is to see whether there is indirect evidence for the long-term tendencies hypothesized above.

Our core argument is that if there are indeed structural trends in the direction of significantly expanded state capabilities connected with national security, this should be manifest in similar trends toward greater elite ideological consensus on national security-related issues as compared with other issues. The reasoning behind this measurement claim is several-fold. First, for capabilities to expand decade after decade, there must not only be resources potentially available (hence a certain degree of economic development), but, at least in representative democratic systems, there must also be a degree of agreement among political elites on the funding of, and programs carried out pursuant to, those capabilities. This agreement is at the level of world views, notably about the long-term position of the country in the face of various threats. Second, Lasswell and other of the above-cited authors point out that the structural trends toward greater national security-related state capabilities involve a greatly aggrandized executive. In representative democracies, though, the phenomenon of interest aggregation implies that many policies are fought out in the legislature. By extension, then, elites in the legislature are less likely to challenge the executive on national security-related issues -- but not on other issues, whether in foreign or domestic policy.[4] Third, several of the literatures stress the role of the mass media in building up images of various national security threats (terrorists, fifth-columnists, etc.); but since the media

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[4] For example, it is striking how rarely one finds significant oversight, much less challenges, to covert activities by even legislatures with considerable institutional power. Consider the oft-quoted response of Senator John Stennis, when asked by then-CIA director James Schlesinger if he wanted to be briefed on an upcoming operation: "No, no, my boy, don't tell me. Just go ahead and do it, but I don't want to know" (Johnson 2012: 151). See also Wetzling 2010 for predictable, but still striking findings, about the lack of oversight in Germany and the UK.

often take their cues from political elites, consistent media images thus imply a measure of elite consensus on the scope and identity of threats. Thus, we recast our three hypotheses as follows:

H1': for democratic, developed countries, there should be long-term tendencies in the direction of ideological consensus among elites on issues connected with national security, whereas no such tendencies should be apparent on other issues of foreign or domestic policy.

H2': countries with overseas empires in 1945 should display proportionately stronger tendencies in the direction of elite ideological consensus regarding national security than those without empires (though this effect may diminish with the advent of decolonization).

H3': countries which are members of multilateral alliances should display proportionately stronger tendencies in the direction of elite ideological consensus regarding national security than those who are either neutrals or only have bilateral military alliances.

The above hypotheses may appear to run counter to a significant literature on elite polarization with respect to foreign policy issues, at least in the United States (e.g., McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; Meernik 1993; Prins and Marshall 2001; Souva and Rohde 2007; Beinart 2008). That literature, though, is not fundamentally at odds with our claims. The concept of ideological consensus used here has to do with accord on world views, i.e., on deep assumptions about various phenomena such as foreign threats and the role played by various states. The components of these views, as we will argue below, covary (this, technically, is what distinguishes ideologies from other collections of opinions) so that knowing certain views can help one predict others. It follows, then, that elites may vigorously disagree on particular issues (e.g., whether to bomb a given set of targets, or whether to maintain an embargo on a specific country) while still sharing core world views (cf. Kavanagh and Morris 1994). This coexistence comes through clearly if one considers the measures used to determine polarization as opposed to consensus. Polarization is typically determined by looking at survey data and roll call votes; by contrast, our approach to measuring ideological consensus is based on overlaps among covarying arguments in extended speeches (see below).

How can the presence and content of an ideology be determined? The relevant literature here is mostly in the field of political psychology, specifically the entailment relations (if A, then B) between different beliefs (Abelson 1968, 1971, 1973, 1986; Abelson and Carroll 1965; Carbonell 1978; Taber 1992; Roseman 1994). Underlying this research is the basic intuition that when we speak about an ideology, we are implying that beliefs are linked so that, for example, knowing something about an individual's views on immigration would lead us to predict what his or her views might be on the welfare state (for an application to foreign policy, see Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008). Although interest in entailment, at least as a series of logically consistent inference relations, has declined in recent years, current work on ideology still presupposes strong covariation among beliefs (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Martin and Desmond 2010; Feldman and Johnston 2013; see also, on concepts, Mormann 1993). Similarly, covariation is assumed to be one of the key aspects of how "framing" works: "words that consistently appear ... reinforcing associations with each other" (Entman 1991: 7; see also Kinder and Sanders 1990; Entman 1993; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Chong and Druckman 2007, 2010); and extremely high levels of covariation among positions are indicative of "motivated reasoning" (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Jost and Amodio 2012; Friedman 2012).

Of course, to argue that ideology should be identified by means of interconnections among beliefs or positions tells us only a bit about how those interconnections can be determined. Work based on opinion surveys (whether of elites or the mass public) or on roll call votes lends itself well to glossing interconnections as sets of bivariate correlations between responses and votes (e.g., Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Baldassari and Gelman 2008: 430-4). However, many, if not most, of the world views that are components of elites' political ideologies, particularly on foreign policy, are assertions, scenarios, negatives, or counterfactuals which are almost never tapped by survey questions (even once, much less repeatedly over long periods of time and for multiple countries) or voted on per se. For this reason, correlational approaches to interconnection will have to be adapted

to deal with the kinds of materials (arguments made during parliamentary debates) which will serve as the basis for the data construction. Consider now those materials.

There is a long history of scholars studying political speeches, in particular those made by legislators in the course of debates, as a way of shedding light on ideology (e.g., van Dijk 1997, 2000, 2008; see also Krebs and Jackson 2007; Finlayson and Martin 2008; Holland 2011; Seymour 2014; Thornton 2014). Two points should be made about this literature. First, and positively, the works demonstrate fairly clearly (as, for that matter, does the pioneering analysis by Abelson and Carroll 1965, cited above, of Goldwater's speeches) that however strategic the choice of language in a speech may be, particularly as a way of positioning and of signaling, speeches ought not therefore to be disregarded as "cheap talk." Legislators do not, in fact, evince significantly different beliefs in public than in private; their credibility as deal-makers is undermined if they articulate different beliefs from one day to the next; the fact that they carefully choose their words does not mean that they hold a different, "true," set of beliefs which could be articulated in some nonlinguistic fashion; and even if they were to display a high level of cynicism about their floor speeches (a phenomenon which is extremely rare among legislators), the fact that they have to ally with some members of parliament, oppose others, and stand for reelection, all on the basis of what they say (and, of course, how they vote), means that the speeches, and not some other, nonexpressed, set of views, is what matters. Note that the need for allies and opponents suggest that instead of analyzing isolated speeches, we focus instead on speeches made in the course of debates on pending legislation.

However, if the scholarly literature on parliamentary speeches shows that they are demonstrably not dismissable as cheap talk, the second point that should be made about that literature is that it conveys a considerably more diffuse message when it comes to the methodology for ascertaining the existence and nature of ideology evoked by such speeches. Different authors focus on different facets of speeches: semantics, anaphora, speech acts, rhetorical tropes, and so forth. Our proposed method is to concentrate on the claims advanced and linked together by legislators in the course of their individual speeches. The argument chains thus resulting are

precisely the type of interconnected ideas that indicate ideology; the chains can then be assessed across speakers to see whether and if so how much similarity there is in them, with high levels of similarity pointing to ideological consensus. We now turn to the details of this method, beginning with how reasoning chains are adduced from speeches.

3. Coding speeches as reasoning chains

Five minutes of listening to legislators speak in almost any parliament are more than enough to demonstrate that their speeches involve any number of elements: cost-benefit analyses, legal arguments, quotations from the Bible, narratives of past or imagined events, predictions about the future, statements about what are or are not facts, attacks on legislative opponents, requisitories against enemies, and praise for heroic behavior, to name but a few.[5] However ludicrous these elements may be, and however much the connections drawn between the elements may violate basic principles of logic or canons of substantive debate, if legislators advance these connected elements as reasons to vote in a certain way, then the task of coding is to adduce those connected elements or, as we shall call them, reasoning chains.

Here is some terminology. An *argument* is of the sort X because of Y. A set-piece speech advances a *claim* -- one should vote for (or against) a bill or resolution -- with the claim being argued for on the basis of at least one *core reason*: vote for the bill because of X, or perhaps because of X and also because of Y. Each core reason, in turn, is argued for on the basis of one or more *secondary reasons*: X because of A, or perhaps X because of A and also because of B. Secondary reasons may themselves be argued for on the basis of additional secondary reasons, and so forth. For any given claim put forward by any speaker, there will thus be at least one *reasoning chain*, comprised of a core reason which is supported by at least one secondary reason and, recursively, any secondary reasons in support of the latter. At the minimum, then, reasoning chains

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[5] In previous work (Thornton and Sylvan 2015a, 2015b), we have focused on sketches about characters (e.g., Saddam Hussein; the "welfare queen") and on covarying beliefs about the consequences of proposed policies. Our aim here is broader: to talk about chains of reasoning, whatever the contents of specific claims may be.

are composed of two connected elements, a core reason and a secondary reason; but if the latter is in turn supported by one or more secondary reasons, the reasoning chain may be composed of three, four, or more connected elements. As we will discuss below, chains may start out with the same core reason and the same immediately supporting secondary reason, then, further down, as it were, diverge into different supporting secondary reasons. Such *compound* chains may, for purposes of similarity assessment, be treated as composed of multiple individual chains. In Figure 1, for example, there are four individual reasoning chains: two *simple* chains, one linking C to B and the other linking F to E to D; and one compound chain with an individual chain linking I to H to G and another individual chain linking J to H to G.[6]

Figure 1 here

Speeches are coded as reasoning chains in a multi-step process. Coders begin with a machine-readable version of each speech, assigning two preliminary codes to each paragraph. One code would be its role in a reasoning chain, namely claim, core reason, or secondary reason, as well as none of the above; the other code would be an abstract paraphrase of the contents of the claim, core reason, or secondary reason.[7] (We find it useful to represent the chains visually along the lines shown in Figure 1. Mapping software permits extraction of maps' reasoning chains as machine-readable vectors, which in turn can be operated on to compute similarity scores for each pair of chains.) Two checks are built into the coding process, the first quantitative (if a given contents-code is the same for two or more paragraphs, it will be taken as in principle a bona fide claim, core reason, or secondary reason; if two or more contents-codes are similar, they are recoded as the same. Conversely and to avoid exaggerating the importance of isolated or unconnected points, if a specific contents-code appears only once in a given speech, it will be recoded as an instance of

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[6] Chains may be interconnected not only because they all lead to the same claim (this is trivially the normal case, although there are speeches in which more than one claim is made [e.g., to vote in favor of something and also to be wary of something else in the future]), but because they may be so-called "divergent structures" (Freeman 1991) in which a given secondary reason is used in support of more than one "higher" reason. We do not discuss such chains here because they pose no particular issues for coding or similarity assessment, though, interestingly, they are not permitted in many kinds of argument mapping software (since they are not, mathematically speaking, trees).

[7] "Lower-level" secondary reasons will normally be cast in semi-abstract terms, such as Chapter VII rather than Korean authorization; if there is a dispute in the legislative debate over a specific evocation of Chapter VII, say, or the details of the Korean authorization, then the paraphrase of the reason will have to be more concrete.

another, already-coded reason, or else merged with other singletons to form a "new" reason, or else discarded).

The other check is on the type of connection. Per our definitions above, each reason is connected to other reasons, or to the claim, by a "because." These *connectors*, as we call them, are subdivided by type: a) legal or conceptual/definitional (e.g., "we can't do X because it would be unconstitutional"); b) historical (e.g., "we should do it because we've done it before"); c) consequential (including slippery slope arguments) of the sort X occurs, triggering Y (e.g., "if we do X, it will put the budget into deficit"); d) normative (e.g., "we can't do X because it's immoral to treat people in that way"; e) anthropological (e.g., "we should do X because it's the only kind of language people like Y understand"); and f) who we are or are not (e.g., "we shouldn't do X because we're a democracy, not a dictatorship").[8] Connectors are first posited, for a particular reasoning chain, for the link between the "lowest" secondary reason and the reason "above" it which it supports. If there is more than one "lowest" secondary reason supporting a reason one level up, then a connector is posited for each of the links. Moving up one level, the connector between the second-lowest and the third-lowest level must be the same as one of the lower-level types, and so on all the way up. Thus, if there is a single lowest connector of type A (for anthropological), the second-to-lowest connector (and all higher ones for that chain) must also be A; if there is a compound chain with two lowest connectors, one of type A and the other of type H (for historical), the second-to-lowest connector must be either A or H and, whichever it is, all higher connectors must be the same, i.e., all A or all H. Violation of this criterion is indicative of either a missing reason (see below) or a miscoded one.[9]

Speakers often do not "fill in the blanks" on their reasoning chains. A legislator may skip a point, perhaps because she considers it too obvious to make or because it is politically too sensitive. In these cases, elements and connectors are inserted into reasoning chains, subject to several

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[8] This list of connectors was put together after provisionally coding a number of speeches in the U.S. Senate debate over Philippines annexation (see below); subsequent coding of speeches in other legislatures may lead to additions.

[9] To be clear, we are not saying that reasons have to be linked into chains by strict logical consistency, but simply that the form of reasoning in a chain is locally homogeneous: speakers may and often do contradict themselves, but if a particular bit of reasoning is heterogeneous, it is not usually grasped by listeners as a single argument.

conditions: a) that there not be two such interpolations next to each other in a given chain; b) that there be a ceiling for the number of interpolations in any particular chain (for the moment, setting the ceiling to 1 does not seem to lead to discarding too many chains); and c) that only interpolations, not extrapolations, are made, i.e., that core reasons are never inserted, nor secondary reasons which would be the "lowest" in one or more chains.

Later in this paper we will walk through an example of how a speech is coded into argument chains. At this point, however, one further point should be addressed, namely whether it is possible for the coding to be carried out automatically as opposed to manually. For the moment, our experience is that manual coding is unavoidable. Although reliable means now exist for extracting affect from speeches (e.g., Young and Soroka 2012) or for parsing speeches to ascertain ideology or topic (e.g., Slapin and Proksch 2014), such methods run into major problems when confronted with deixis (words and phrases whose meaning is context-specific) or with so-called dog whistle politics (i.e., the use of certain expressions which will be interpreted in a savvy way by the target audience while being ignored by other audiences).[10]

4. Assessing similarity of reasoning

Once argument chains have been abduced from speeches, their similarity can be assessed to permit the degree of ideological consensus, for a particular debate, to be determined. Let us begin with some terminology. A given speaker m may, in a speech, put forward a set of core reasons. We label the i-th core reason for the speaker C_{im}, the secondary reason put forward by the speaker in direct support of that core reason S_{1im}, the secondary reason put forward in direct support of S_{1im} as

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[10] The canonical example is the late Lee Atwater, a Republican Party operative who, when interviewed in 1981, explained how politicians appealed to Southern white voters over time: "You start out in 1954 by saying, 'Nigger, nigger, nigger.' By 1968 you can't say 'nigger' -- that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states' rights and all that stuff, and you're getting so abstract. Now [1981] you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites." http://www.thenation.com/article/170841/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy

S_{2im}, and so forth up to the final ("bottom-most") secondary reason put forward, which will be labeled as S_{fim}. Thus, for speaker m, the i-th reasoning chain could be as short as C_{im}-S_{fim} or as long as (for example, if there were five secondary reasons in a particular chain) C_{im}-S_{1im}-S_{2im}-S_{3im}-S_{4im}-S_{fim}.

How to determine the similarity of two reasoning chains? Our intuition, drawn to some degree from sociological work on "optimal matching" algorithms for event sequences, is that if two reasoning chains have the same reasons in the same positions, they are similar (they are not necessarily identical, because we are assessing abstract paraphrases, not the exact words or references in particular speeches).[11] If, however, a pair of chains shares two reasons, but one chain has either a) one or more secondary reasons not contained by the other chain (there is one exception to this; see below) or b) one or more secondary reasons in a different order than in the other chain, then we will say that the chains are partly similar. Finally, and because of our use of chains as a way of getting at covariance, if a pair of chains has zero or one reasons in common, they are dissimilar.[12] To see how this works, consider the following cases.

I. Two different speakers each putting forward a reasoning chain with a single secondary reason, C_{im}-S_{fim} and C_{jn}-S_{fjn}. If $C_{im}=C_{jn}$ and $S_{fim}=S_{fjn}$, then the chains are similar.

II. Two different speakers each putting forward a reasoning chain with more than one secondary reason, for example C_{im}-S_{1im}-S_{fim} and C_{jn}-S_{1jn}-S_{fjn}. If $C_{im}=C_{jn}$, $S_{1im}=S_{1jn}$, and $S_{fim}=S_{fjn}$ (notice that in this case, the order of the two secondary reasons is also the same), then the chains are similar.

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[11] The idea behind optimal matching is that two sequences are similar in inverse proportion to the number of "edits" that would be necessary to transform one into the other (Abbott 1990 is the original piece; there are numerous extensions, such as Dijkstra and Taris 1995; Robette and Bry 2012; and Elzinga and Studer 2015; the single strongest critique remains that of Wu 2000). Although there are numerous problems with this idea for studies of event sequences (e.g., a life course or a career trajectory), from our perspective, reasoning chains with certain elements in common are similar precisely insofar as they are in the "proper" order and with the same elements. In other words, even if reasoning chains cannot meaningfully be transformed by such edits, the idea underlying an edit -- that a change in elements or in order moves one away from similarity -- still makes sense. However, because even small differences in reasoning can make for big differences in outcome (cf. the extensive literature on the importance of question wording in survey design), we measure similarity on an ordinal, not an interval, scale: reasoning chains are similar, partly similar, or dissimilar.

[12] Note that each of these criteria focuses on the covariance of core and secondary reasons, not of claims and reasons. Since most speeches on the same side of a question make the same claim, including claims in similarity calculations would artificially inflate the similarity of speakers on the same side while exaggerating the differences in reasoning of speakers on opposite sides.

III. Two different speakers each putting forward a reasoning chain where one speaker's chain has the same reasons in the same relative order as the other speaker's chain, but in which one of the speakers has an additional secondary but nonfinal reason, for example C_{im}-S_{1im}-S_{fim} and C_{jn}-S_{fjn}. If $C_{im}=C_{jn}$ and $S_{fim}=S_{fjn}$ and if the connectors between C_{im} and S_{1im}, S_{1im} and S_{fim}, and C_{jn} and S_{fjn} are the same, then the chains are the same (the rationale in this case is that silence on the part of speaker n does not mean that s/he would not have been able to put forward the additional secondary reason advanced by speaker m, especially given the similarity in connectors of the two speakers. This is the exception referred to above).

IV. Two different speakers each putting forward a reasoning chain with more than one secondary reason, for example C_{im}-S_{1im}-S_{fim} and C_{jn}-S_{1jn}-S_{fjn}. If $C_{im}=C_{jn}$, $S_{fim}=S_{fjn}$, but $S_{1im}{\neq}S_{fjn}$, then the chains are partly similar. For another three-element reasoning chain, if $C_{im}=C_{jn}$, $S_{1im}=S_{1jn}$, but $S_{fim}{\neq}S_{fjn}$, then again the chains are partly similar. Finally, and perhaps slightly more controversially, if for yet another three-element reasoning chain, $C_{im}{\neq}C_{jn}$, $S_{1im}=S_{1jn}$, and $S_{fim}=S_{fjn}$, then again the chains are partly similar.[13] In general, for pairs of reasoning chains of any length, if a) the cores are the same, b) one of the secondary reasons is the same (and in the same order relative to the other secondary reasons in the chain), and c) at least one of the secondary reasons occupying the same ordered position in the chain (e.g., both are the third secondary reason) is different,[14] then the chains are partly similar.

V. Two different speakers each putting forward a reasoning chain with three or more secondary reasons and where at least two of the secondary reasons, though the same in content, are in a different order, for example C_{im}-S_{1im}-S_{2im}-S_{fim} and C_{jn}-S_{1jn}-S_{2jn}-S_{fjn}. If $C_{im}=C_{jn}$, $S_{fim}=S_{fjn}$, $S_{1im}=S_{2jn}$, and $S_{2im}=S_{1jn}$ (i.e., switching around the position of the first and second secondary reasons from the first speaker's chain to the second speaker's), then the chains are partly similar.

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[13] The condition is a bit more controversial because it permits chains to be partly similar even though their core reasons are different. However, there are pairs of speeches in which the speakers start from the same linked reasons and then end up in different places, and so for now, we count these cases as partly similar, too.

[14] This third condition is necessary to rule out Type III cases.

VI. Two different speakers each putting forward a reasoning chain with one or zero common reasons, for example C_{im}-S_{1im}-S_{fim} and C_{jn}-S_{1jn}-S_{fjn}. If $C_{im}=C_{jn}$ but $S_{1im}\neq S_{1jn}$ and $S_{fim}\neq S_{fjn}$, or if $S_{1im}=S_{1jn}$ but $C_{im}\neq C_{jn}$ and $S_{fim}\neq S_{fjn}$, or if $S_{fim}=S_{fjn}$ but $C_{im}\neq C_{jn}$ and $S_{1im}\neq S_{jn}$, or if $C_{im}\neq C_{jn}$, $S_{1im}\neq S_{1jn}$, and $S_{fim}\neq S_{fjn}$, then the chains are dissimilar.

Using the above criteria, it is possible to determine the similarity of any pair of reasoning chains. We then want to aggregate across pairs of reasoning chains for each pair of speakers, taking into account the total number of possible pairs. The simplest way of doing this is to assign a score of 1 point for two chains being similar, 1/2 point for two chains being partly similar, and 0 points for two chains being dissimilar. Then the average similarity score for a given pair of speakers m and n in a particular debate, where m puts forward k reasoning chains and n puts forward l reasoning chains, and where the similarity score for any pair of chains R_{mi} and R_{nj} is denoted by $R_{mi} \cdot R_{nj}$, is

$$\frac{\sum_{i,j=1}^{k,l} R_{mi} \cdot R_{nj}}{kl}$$

Thus for example, if two speakers each put forward three reasoning chains, with one chain from each speaker being similar, a second chain from each speaker being partly similar, and all other pairs of chains being dissimilar, then the average similarity score for two speakers in that debate would be 1/6.

With an average similarity score for each pair of speakers, it is possible to determine an overall average score across all pairs of speakers satisfying a given condition: for example, those speakers on the same side of the vote, or from the same political party, or from the same region of the country. The overall averages for any particular set of speakers could then be compared, with the differences in group averages being an indicator of the lack of consensus.[15] That difference can

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[15] Alternatively, if one thinks that ideological consensus should be greater, for a given overall average similarity score, when one side in a debate has many more speakers than the other, then one could calculate the overall average for all speakers rather than compare the average for different groups. In the research project on the national security state for which this methodology was developed, we reject this option, choosing instead to calculate intergroup comparisons. Our rationale is that if opposing sides in highly contested and acrimonious debates evince high levels of similarity in reasoning, the import of their disagreements is correspondingly attenuated.

then be assessed, for a given country, over time and the trend, if any, compared to analogous trends on issues other than national security, as well as across countries.

5. An application: U.S. annexation of the Philippines

To get a sense of the methodology presented above, we turn to an example, one of the most famous debates in the history of United States foreign policy. After the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, U.S. leaders found themselves occupying not only Cuba, whose ostensible independence as a means of ending Spanish misrule was the stated motive for the war, but other Spanish territories, including the Philippines. The Treaty of Paris, negotiated in 1898 between the U.S. and Spain, stipulated that Spain would cede the Philippines to the U.S. in exchange for $20 million, and it was this cession which sparked a furious debate both in the Senate, when it considered ratifying the treaty, and in the country as a whole (Lasch 1958; Williams 1980; Lafeber 1986). An American Anti-Imperialist League was formed in opposition to U.S. colonial expansion and included among its members a number of luminaries: a former U.S. president and other politicians (Grover Cleveland, Carl Schurz, and John Sherman), a prominent industrialist/philanthropist (Andrew Carnegie), a trade union leader (Samuel Gompers), the leading U.S. urban social worker (Jane Addams), famous academics (John Dewey, William James, and William Graham Sumner), and the country's leading writers (Ambrose Bierce, Finley Peter Dunne, William Dean Howells, Henry James, Edgar Lee Masters, and Mark Twain). In the end, of course, the Senate did ratify the treaty, thereby approving, at least symbolically, U.S. transformation into a world power.

The debate in the Senate stretched from the very end of 1898 until February 1899. Close to 30 speeches were made, with proponents and opponents speaking in roughly equal numbers. Most speeches were, at least by modern standards, quite long, running 6 to 8 printed pages, with an

extremely small typeface, in the *Congressional Record*. The style of speaking and (by today's standards) the extraordinary levels of racial stereotyping, can best be seen in Figure 2 by a page from one of those speeches, in this case that of the Louisiana Democrat Donelson Caffery.

Figure 2 here

Caffery's entire speech was coded in line with the procedure described in section 3 above. A simplified map of the speech, with reasons pitched at an abstract level, with connectors not specified, and with secondary reasons supporting more than one other secondary or core reason (see footnote 6 above) shown in duplicate because of software limitations, is listed in Figure 3. It will be

Figure 3 here

noted that the speech contains five individual reasoning chains, with the middle three chains being part of a compound reasoning chain. Note also that there are three core reasons, that one of the secondary reasons directly supports two different core reasons, and that another secondary reason (the infamous "tropical people" characterization of Filipinos) indirectly supports all three core reasons. This multiple use, in which a given secondary reason is part of two or more reasoning chains, is in fact common in political debates; whether it indicates a deliberate attempt to reuse talking points that seem resonant or instead is indicative of a speaker's fixation on a particular issue we cannot say.

After mapping each speech, it is possible to compile a list of all the individual reasons used in one or more chains during the debate. This list, a portion of which (for seven speeches, three pro and four con[16]) is displayed in Table 1, is a useful tool: it can be used to check each map for

Table 1 here

redundancies and facilitates machine calculation of similarity scores. Note that there are approximately twice as many reasons put forward by anti-annexationist speakers as by the other side, a disproportion due in part to the more disciplined and stripped-down arguments employed by the annexationists (though speeches on both sides take up more or less the same number of pages in

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[16] Pro: Platt (R-CT,19 December 1898), Teller (R-CO, 20 December 1898), Foraker (R-OH, 11 January 1899); con: Caffery (D-LA, 6 January 1899), Hoar (R-MA, 9 January 1899), Mason (R-IL, 10 January 1899), McLaurin (D-SC, 13 January 1899).

the *Congressional Record*). Reasoning chains were then extracted from the argument maps; they are

shown, for each speaker, in Table 2. Even a casual glance at that table makes apparent how different

Table 2 here

the reasoning was by each side in the debate. In general, pro- and anti-annexationists advanced very

different reasons in support of their positions. This impression can be supplemented by a more

systematic analysis, shown in Table 3, of the similarity scores for each pair of speakers.

Table 3 here

Three points are clear from Table 3. First, the pro-annexationists were far more similar in

their reasoning than the anti-annexationists. Even though two of the latter were Southern

Democrats, who predictably shared blood-curdling views on race,[17] they nonetheless were far more

scattershot in their critiques, at least in the early rounds of the debate, than were the former. Second,

the pro-annexationists confined themselves largely to legal and precedent-based arguments,

deliberately side-stepping many of the horrors evoked by the anti-annexationists. This could

indicate a reluctance to face directly the idea of a colonial empire (see the third point below); it

could also indicate a strategy of putting off larger questions for a later time.[18] Third, and most

immediately to the point for our purposes, there was practically no similarity at all in the reasoning

of the two sides. Yes, Teller shared with both Caffery and McLaurin the secondary reasoning

chain[19] portion in which the Filipinos as a tropical people are deemed incapable of self-governance,

but that is one, extremely limited, bit of reasoning which, notoriously led to completely opposed

conclusions.[20] Given this extremely low level of cross-side similarity, it seems reasonable to

conclude that at least in 1899, there was no ideological consensus in the United States whatever on

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[17] McLaurin, for example, started his speech by lamenting the prospect of admitting "a mongrel and semibarbarous population into our body politic" and went on from there.

[18] Sparrow (2006) argues that it was only over the course of the next decade or so, with a series of Supreme Court cases, that the characteristics of U.S. territorial populations as having highly abridged political rights would be elaborated.

[19] If we were to insist that partial similarity must involve shared core reasons (see footnote 13), then there would be no overlap at all between the two sides. However, as discussed above, we consider such a condition to be too stringent.

[20] In contradistinction to the Southerners' claims that the Filipinos would forever need to be ruled by force, pro-annexationists argued that U.S. rule would be uplifting and lead eventually to self-governance; in McKinley's famous formulation, "there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them."

national security,[21] a finding that matches perfectly the state-building literature referred to above, which dates the development of modern armed force structures, professional state administrators, and other building blocks of what later became the national security state, precisely to the impetus provided by the annexation of the Philippines. Preliminary work by us on consensus in other time periods (1939, 1964, 1999, 2002) suggests that as late as 40 years after the annexation debate, U.S. elites still reasoned in a highly disparate fashion about national security.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we have proposed a methodology for studying the national security state by indirect means, namely via the analysis of political debates to ascertain trends in elite ideological consensus about national security. A preliminary application of the methodology suggests that it is tractable technically and that in terms of measurement of the concept, it has at least some degree of convergent validity. Of course, whether the methodology can be scaled up for use in a number of parliaments over a 50-year period is another question, and one on which we are currently working.

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[21] Arguably, the concept itself barely existed then; only in the 1940s did the term begin to be used regularly by U.S. political elites (Romm 1993: ch. 1).

Figure 1
Four reasoning chains

Figure 2

Portion of a speech (anti-annexation, D. Caffery, 1899)

the Saviour; that is the message from Him who preached peace on earth and good will to men. Sir, Christianity can not be advanced by force, and the twin sister of Christianity, the free government of a great people, can not be advanced by force.

Do we know, does anybody know, that these people want our power over them? The papers are now full of rebellions in the Philippines. The press is full of the discontent of the Porto Ricans. Are we to proceed, by an overpowering military strength, to force upon an unwilling people the beneficence of a Constitution which they reject? We have been the exemplars of liberty, and we have taught the world that the best Government upon the earth was the freest Government upon the earth. There is no doubt that the advance toward parliamentary reform and a greater exercise of the right of suffrage in European countries is due to the example set by the United States. Manhood suffrage in England has proceeded at a rapid pace. Even the despotisms, as we call the governments of continental Europe, have advanced in parliamentary reform, and the people have their rights in the Reichstag, and in the Cortes, and throughout Europe in every direction. This is largely the fruit of our example.

Mr. President, I think it would not be amiss should I read something from Professor Seeley:

The prodigious greatness to which it—

Speaking of England—

has attained makes the question of its future infinitely important and at the same time more anxious, because it is evident that the great colonial extension of our state exposes it to new dangers from which in its ancient insular insignificance it was free.

I quote from the same author, page 54:

I remarked before that Greater Britain is an extension of the English state and not merely of the English nationality. But it is an equally striking characteristic of Greater Britain that nevertheless it is an extension of the English nationality. When a nationality is extended without any extension of the state, as in the case of the Greek colonies, there may be an increase of moral and intellectual influence, but there is no increase of political power. On the other hand, when the state advances beyond the limits of the nationality, its power becomes precarious and artificial. This is the condition of most empires. It is the condition, for example, of our own Empire in India. The English State is powerful there, but the English nation is but an imperceptible drop in the ocean of an Asiatic population. And when a nation extends itself into other territories the chances are that it will there meet with other nationalities which it can not destroy or completely drive out, even if it succeeds in conquering them. When this happens it has a great and permanent difficulty to contend with. The subject or rival nationalities can not be perfectly assimilated and remain as a permanent cause of weakness and danger. It has been the fortune of England in extending itself to evade on the whole this danger, for it has occupied parts of the globe which were so empty that they offered an unbounded scope for new settlement. There was land for every emigrant who chose to come, and the native races were not in a condition sufficiently advanced to withstand even the peaceful competition, much less the power, of the immigrants.

I desire to draw attention to the difference between extending nationality and extending empire. This author states a truth which is read in the history of every extension of the rule of a superior race over millions of an inferior race inhabiting a country where the superior race can not impress upon the inferior race its institutions. You can extend your power, but if you want to extend your nationality, extend your institutions, extend your liberty, you must do it with people of your own kind. They are the ones to be governed by your law. Every other extension is a weakness. Every extension of the sort that is contemplated in this case is a crime. You can not obliterate the nationality of 10,000,000 Malays.

There are 287,000,000 East Indians in the peninsula of India. Great Britain has held that country for two hundred and fifty years, and yet there are there but six hundred and odd thousand Englishmen all told. The same of Algeria; the same of the British West Indies; the same of Spanish America; the same of every country in the equatorial belt unsusceptible of settlement by white men. Wherever there has been a strong nationality in the tropics adapted to the soil and to the climate, no other nationality has ever been able to exterminate or govern them except by physical force. Our nationality can not extend to this Pacific group of islands. Our power can go there; our flag can float there; but the genius of American liberty will remain upon our shores. It can not be implanted there. The material is not there for it to flourish and grow upon.

Is that the sort of "expansion" we want? Is that the sort of empire we are derided as old fogies and little Americans for not desiring to establish? Mr. President, we are told that duty and destiny and some undefinable power are pushing us on to a splendid and magnificent future that the fathers never dreamt of. This evil thing we are called on to do can not be painted in such bright, dazzling colors as to deceive the American eye. It is nothing but a wanton stretch of power. It is lust for power and greed for land, veneered with the tawdriness of false humanity. You can not hide its hideousness with the clothing of high-sounding phrases. You can not prostitute the flag made to float over freemen by driving under its folds millions of slaves.

I want no despotism, sir. I do not want our country to be poisoned at the core. I do not want our people to be accustomed

to the exercise of unlimited authority by Congress. That is a poison which has sapped the life of all republics, and it will sap the life of our Republic. If you destroy the germ of our institution you destroy the government built on the germ.

They tell us that the accident of war has made it our duty to embrace this dangerous opportunity and to take within our folds these people not fit to be incorporated in our midst. What duty? Do we owe any other duty to mankind than to alleviate his condition of hardship, to inspire him with a love of free institutions, and by our example to teach him to follow those institutions? When we get into war, and happen as a result of war to acquire a foothold in the enemy's territory, must we take it, whether or not it will be an element of danger and destruction in our midst? Is that the principle which is advocated to-day? It appears to me so, sir.

Do we want this territory as a means of power? It is a source of weakness. Do we want it as an avenue of trade? Sir, the idea is absurd. We are capturing the markets of civilized man. Five-sixths of the enormous exports of the United States go to Great Britain. The statistics show that not one-tenth of the exports of the United States go to Asia, Africa, and South America combined. Nine-tenths of our exports go to our neighbors in western Europe, and, sir, it is manifest that if we want markets for our surplus manufactures, our surplus cereals, all that we can not consume, we must send them to people who will consume them.

What do the dwellers near the equator consume? A half-civilized man wants but little. Such people always export more than they import. Their wants are very few. It requires but little to clothe them. They feed at home, and the balance of trade is always in their favor. If anybody will take the list of our exports and imports, he will find that there is not a single one of these tropical countries which does not import more into the United States than it imports from the United States; and if you look to see where the bulk of our trade is, you will find that it is with people of our kind—enlightened people, consuming people, intelligent people, people who have wants to be supplied and who have something to exchange as against the products we exchange with them.

Sir, those distant possessions would cost more in ten years for garrisons than they would yield profit to the United States in a century. They would be the graveyard of our youth; and what an avenue they would open for the exploiter, the promoter, and the soldiers of fortune! What an opening for piling up taxes to keep up garrisons, standing armies, and war vessels!

There are a number of other passages in this book equally as strong as those I read. I will read from another Englishman, Mr. Kidd, an author of considerable reputation. Mr. Kidd is an expansionist. He is writing about the United States on page 45 of his book, and he says:

The problem which the writer of the passages here quoted—

He is quoting from some other writer—

is struggling with is that which confronts the United States in the period upon which we are entering. It is that which already confronts, under a hundred forms in various parts of the world, every thinking administrator of Great Britain whose duty lies within the Tropics. The first step toward any successful solution of it is to look it fairly in the face and frankly recognize its nature.

It is not a question of the relative merits of any form of government; it is not even a question of the relative merits of any race amongst civilized peoples; it is simply and purely the question of the ultimate relation of the white man to the Tropics. This is the question to the solution of which the English-speaking world must, by force of circumstances, address itself in the time which is upon us. Let us see how far we have got in evolving the answer to such a problem from the teaching of past and current events.

I read from page 48:

In the first place, the attempt to acclimatize the white man in the Tropics must be recognized to be a blunder of the first magnitude. All experiments based upon the idea are mere idle and empty enterprises, foredoomed to failure. Excepting only the deportation of the African races under the institution of slavery, probably no other idea which has held the mind of our civilization during the last three hundred years has led to so much physical and moral suffering and degradation or has strewn the world with the wrecks of so many gigantic enterprises.

In the second place, the question of exploiting any tropical region by regarding it primarily as an estate to be worked for gain must be abandoned. The endeavor of the continental nations of Europe to base the relationship of the occupying power to such territories and their inhabitants on the principle of profit, surrounding the regions with laws and tariffs operating in the exclusive interest of the power in possession, must be regarded as merely a return in modified form to the old plantation system. Such a system is incompatible with the underlying spirit which is governing the development of the English-speaking peoples themselves, and it could, therefore, never have behind it that larger ethical conception which alone could obtain for it any measure of support as a permanent policy among these people.

The relation of the white man to the tropical people must be that of dominance. The natives are not susceptible of governing themselves after our standard. Nor is there any record that I know of of any other native government there which is not now, as it has always been, despotic. They are therefore incapable of what we style self-government.

Mr. President, here are two men, both Englishmen, both writing alike, and no doubt if I had the time to look more carefully

Figure 3
Argument map of a speech (anti-annexation, D. Caffery, 1899)

Table 1
Core and secondary reasons used by seven speakers in the Philippines annexation debate

01	Can't become a state in the future
02	Can't rule themselves
03	Tropical people
04	Despotic/rule without consent of the governed
05	Cruelty
06	India and other European colonies
07	Anti-Christian/wicked
08	Not increase exports
09	Few material needs
10	No right to annex
11	No consent by Filipinos
12	Capable of self-rule
13	Double standard compared to Cuba
14	Filipinos were our allies
15	Will be a rebellion/war
16	Expensive bureaucracy
17	Destroy US as republic
18	Greece and Rome lost republican liberty
19	White men won't move there
20	Can't become US citizens
21	US has sovereign power to annex territory that doesn't become a state
22	Supreme Court decisions
23	Historical US precedents
24	US Civil War (attack on southern Democrats)
25	OK to annex without consent of governed
26	Other countries annex without consent of governed
27	Strategic reasons led to annex in past without consent (Hawaii; anti-anti-annexationists)
28	Annexation not despotic
29	US rule will be temporary and beneficent
30	Europeans want annex other places in Asia and Africa
31	Obligation to protect from Europe
32	Obligation to uplift

Table 2
Reasoning chains used by seven speakers in the Philippines annexation debate

Platt (P)	Teller (P)	Foraker (P)	Caffery (C)	Hoar (C)	Mason (C)	McLaurin (C)
21-22	21-22	21-22	01-02-03	16-04-11	10-11	01-02-19
21-23	21-23	21-23	04-02-03	17-04-11	10-12	01-02-03
	31-30	25-26	04-05-06	17-07-15-04-11	10-13	01-20-03
	31-02-03	25-27	04-07	17-18	10-14	04-20-03
	32-02-03	28-29	08-09-03		15-11	17-04-01-03
		28-02				17-06
		28-30				

Note: P stands for pro, C for con. Reasoning chains should be read across, with the first number corresponding to the core reason and the remaining ones to secondary reasons, with each of the latter supporting the reason immediately to its left. See Table 1 for the reasons corresponding to each number.

Table 3
Pairwise similarity scores in the Philippines annexation debate

Pro-Pro
Platt-Teller	.20
Platt-Foraker	.14
Teller-Foraker	.06
Average	.13

Con-Con
Caffery-Hoar	0
Caffery-Mason	0
Caffery-McLaurin	.12
Hoar-Mason	0
Hoar-McLaurin	.04
Mason-McLaurin	0
Average	.03

Pro-Con
Platt-Caffery	0
Platt-Hoar	0
Platt-Mason	0
Platt-McLaurin	0
Teller-Caffery	.08
Teller-Hoar	0
Teller-Mason	0
Teller-McLaurin	.03
Foraker-Caffery	0
Foraker-Hoar	0
Foraker-Mason	0
Foraker-McLaurin	0
Average	.01

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